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ARTICLES
A Comparison of Governance of Publicly-Owned
Mass Transit
by Neil Hamilton,* Bruce Feldhusen** and Heather Crisp
I. INTRODUCTION
DURING THE SUMMER of 1978, the authors conducted a survey of
governmentally-controlled urban mass transit systems in the United
States and Canada. The study focused on 17 systems in 7 States, and 10
systems in 3 Canadian Provinces, and examined the formal legal structure
governing each system, including both their enabling legislation and ad-
ministrative policies. This material was expanded upon and enriched
through interviews with executive management in each system.1 The
methodology and results of the U.S. studies have been extensively re-
ported in Governance of Public Enterprise: A Case Study of Urban Mass
Transit,2 and will not be repeated in detail herein. The Canadian data,
collected primarily for comparative purposes, have not been published
elsewhere, so a system-by-system summary appears in the Appendix.
The study arose out of an awareness of both the importance of Gov-
ernment enterprise in the economies of the United States and Canada
and the limited scholarship on this phenomenon in the two countries.
The term "Government enterprise" includes all production processes pro-
viding a good or a service which are effectively controlled, directly or indi-
rectly, by a branch of the Government itself or by a body established by
the Government to conduct the undertaking in the public interest.
Over the course of this century, Federal, State and Provincial, and
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local governments in the United States and Canada have created a vari-
ety of Government enterprises in the form of Government corporations,
agencies, authorities, departments, and districts to produce diverse goods
and services. Although the growth in the use of these entities has been
gradual, their cumulative role in both economies is now substantial. For
example, the U.S. Federal Government created 17 new Government cor-
porations or Government-sponsored enterprises exhibiting varying de-
grees of Government control just in the period from 1960 to 1973. At the
State and local levels, there are at least 6,000 local and regional authori-
ties and 1,000 State and interstate authorities.3 Similarly, in Canada
which has a longer history of Government involvement in the transporta-
tion industry, the number of Crown Corporations alone has risen from 33
in 1951, to 54 in 1977.4
Perhaps because the increase in the use of these entities has been
gradual, and perhaps because government production of goods and ser-
vices is something of an embarrassment to many economists, 5 Govern-
ment enterprises have received surprisingly little academic attention.
There are two conceptually distinct, although functionally related, issues
which require further scrutiny: why do Government enterprises exist, and
how should they be designed to achieve their goals?
Surprisingly; there seems to be no coherent theory which satisfactor-
ily explains why Government enterprises came into existence initially, nor
why their numbers have steadily increased. It is beyond the scope of this
article to consider the social and political consequences which flow from
increased direct Government participation in the economy. Even with
these aside, many important questions must be answered regarding the
comparative efficiency of Government and private enterprise. For exam-
ple, are there certain social goals or types of goals which we would expect
to be better performed by Government enterprise than by private or reg-
ulated industry? Is Government enterprise the most efficient response to
certain types of market imperfections? One would expect stronger and
more fully documented affirmative responses to these and similar ques-
tions than are presently available to justify the expansion of the tradi-
tional Government role into markets which were once considered to be
the exclusive domain of private enterprise.
The great diversity of institutional design in Government enterprises,
even within a single industry such as urban mass transit, is also deserving
of further study. Certainly there is great diversity within private enter-
3 See A. WALSH, THE PUBLIC BUsINESS: THE POLITICS AND PRACTICES OF GOVERNMENT
CORPORAToNS, 6, 353 (1978).4 Crown Corporations are department, agency and proprietary corporations of the fed-
eral government which are permitted to keep their own accounts. PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE
CROWN CORPORATIONS: DIRECTION, CONTROL, ACCOUNTABILrrY 12-15 (1977).
5 Pashigan, Consequenes and Causes of Public Ownership of Urban Transit Facilities,
84 J. POL. ECON. 1239, 1240 (Dec. 1976).
[Vol. 6:1
2
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 6 [1983], Iss. , Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol6/iss/3
MASS TRANSIT
prise, but the term suggests at least some basic points of comparison. For
example, the private share-offering company model is almost universal for
large-scale private enterprise. Moreover, in response to experience, educa-
tion, and competitive market pressures, similar private firms have devel-
oped fairly similar divisions of the policy formation and operational man-
agement functions.
There is no similar uniformity among Government enterprises even
in the same industry. In Canada and the United States there are at least
three general types or models of Government enterprise in common use:
the company form, the Government department form, and the public cor-
poration form.6 In the transit industry, the survey revealed great differ-
ences from system to system with regard to policy formation and the pol-
icy operation function distinctions. Government involvement itself
creates considerable differences among Government enterprises, depend-
ing upon whether the focus of power is Federal, State or Provincial, local,
or diffused among several Governments.
Urban mass transit was selected as the specific focus for the study for
two reasons. First, mass transit by bus in the United States has shifted
from primarily private ownership to almost total public ownership in less
than 20 years. Among the 117 largest U.S. cities, only 10 had publicly-
owned transit systems in 1949. By 1959, three more systems had become
publicly-owned. However, from the late 1950's through the 1970's, mass
transit revenues failed to keep pace with costs. This created a need for
large subsidies if operations were to continue, and apparently there ex-
isted concomitant political pressure to make the transit system public. By
1969, 31 more systems were converted to the public sector; and, by 1979,
an additional 62 systems were converted. Thus, as of 1979 private carriers
have survived in only 11 of the 117 largest cities in the United States.7
The second reason mass transit by bus was chosen for this study is
the enormous and continuing commitment of public funds to mass transit
subsidization. Since 1970, transit has been one of the most rapidly grow-
ing of all U.S. Federal programs. It seems likely that there will be a con-
tinuing commitment to subsidize this industry on both the State and
Federal Government levels. The U.S. Senate, for example, approved a bill
in 1980 to provide for $14 billion for capital improvements and $9.5 bil-
lion in operating subsidies to urban transit systems over the next five
years.8 Even the Reagan Administration seems committed to some capital
subsidies.' Among the States, commitment to transit subsidies remains
' UNITED STATES TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, SOME PROBLEMS IN THE OR-
GANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN THE INDUSTRIAL FIELD 5 (1954);
U.N. Doc. St/TAA/M/7 (1954)[hereinafter cited as U.N. MEMO].
7 N. HAMILTON AND P. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 4.
S. 2720, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. 8143, 8174 (daily ed. June 25, 1980).
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Department of Transportation and Related
Agencies Appropriations for 1982 of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 526 (1981)(statement of Arthur Teele).
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high. For example, the Minnesota Legislature recently authorized signifi-
cant transit operating subsidies.1"
The Canadian systems were chosen in order to compare the Cana-
dian experience with the findings in the earlier U.S. study. In most areas,
public ownership of mass transit systems has had a much longer history
than in the United States; the Toronto Transit System has been publi-
cally owned since 1920, the London Transit System since 1951, and the
Hamilton Street Railway Company since 1960. Increased public spending
is also characteristic of the Canadian experience. While most of the sys-
tems which were studies operated at a profit in the 1960's and early
1970's, more recently they have become reliant on public subsidies."
With the selection of urban mass transit as the industry for study,
this article focuses upon the problem of institutional design for Govern-
ment enterprises providing mass transit services, and attempts to develop
an ideal model of institutional design for the industry. In any Govern-
ment enterprise, including one in urban mass transit, institutional design
and goal achievement are importantly and inextricably related to one an-
other. 2 It follows that meaningful comparisons between private and Gov-
ernment enterprises are impossible without first specifying what institu-
tional structure the Government enterprise will adopt. Actual
performance comparisons of Government and private enterprises in simi-
lar fields will be inconclusive if one is comparing a standard model of a
private enterprise with a Government enterprise that might easily im-
prove performance with a different institutional form. Thus, this study of
institutional form in the transit industry in the United States and Ca-
nada should eventually assist in answering the other basic question: Is
government enterprise, properly deiigned, a preferable alternative to pri-
vate enterprise alternatives in the transit industry? The approach taken
here may also influence the analysis of the same questions in other
industries.
A few precautionary notes are in order. In the absence of previous
research, no basis exists for the formulating and formal testing of hypoth-
eses. The authors therefore seek to present information concerning the
legal structure, policy formulation, and evaluation of management in the
systems selected in a structured format. At this stage, intuition and in-
ductive reasoning play major roles in the critical analysis of these issues.
The article and its conclusions are therefore offered for constructive de-
bate toward the formulation of an optimal model of governance for gov-
ernment enterprise in the mass transit industry.
10 Act of May 29, 1981, ch. 363, §55, 1981 Minn. Sesa. Law Serv. 2054 (West).
" Relevant data are in the Canada Year Book, published by Statistics Canada.
12 U.N. MEMo, supra note 5, at 17; A. WALSH, supra note 3, at 10, 202; Roberts, An
Evolutionary and Institutional View of the Behavior of Public and Private Companies, 65
Am. EcoN. REV. 415, 415-16 (1975); Seidman, The Government Corporation: Organization
and Controls, 14 PuB. AD. REV. 183, 185 (Summer 1954).
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The body of the article is divided into three sections. In Section II
which follows immediately below we draw upon the theoretical literature
and observations from the case studies to develop a general model of the
government enterprise providing urban mass transit service. In Section
III we present the findings of the case studies, noting the differences
within and between the systems in each country, and compare our find-
ings to the general model developed earlier. In Section IV we draw from
the observations made earlier in the paper, and attempt to illustrate how
a system could be designed which would correspond closely to the general
model
I. A MODEL FOR GOVERNMENT ENTERPRISE PROVIDING URBAN MASS
TRANsIT SERvicES
A. The Concept of Welfare Maximization
The following general model of an "ideal" legal structure for an ur-
ban mass transit system is based both on observations from the case
studies and the theoretical literature. Economics gives an uncontroversial
starting point for our inquiry; that is, it suggests that the ideal legal
structure is one which maximizes the welfare of all people affected by the
system.
In practice, welfare maximization in a market economy is achieved
by creating conditions for Pareto optimality provided certain income dis-
tribution constraints are met. A Pareto optimal state is defined as a state
where no one can be made better off without making someone else worse
off, where better and worse are determined by the affected parties.1 3
When a Pareto optimal state is reached, all the options to create better
conditions for someone without harming someone else have been ex-
pended. At this point the society must, by definition, create worse condi-
tions for at least one person if there is a change in the economic state.
Nearly all people agree that a person or group should be made better off
(in their own opinion) if it can be done without harming someone else.
The Pareto optimal criteria stand as a very uncontroversial social
goal based on a nearly universally held value judgment. It is the taking of
all gains when there is no accompanying loss. One should note, however,
that Pareto optimality says nothing about how an economic "pie" is to be
divided. Clearly, once Pareto optimality is established, any rearrangement
of circumstances makes someone worse off. If such a change is to be con-
sidered, the value of this change must now be decided with a much more
controversial value judgment which will determine if one person's or
group's gain is considered to outweigh the others' loss. In practice, these
more controversial value judgments concerning income distribution are
embodied in legislatively determined constraints. The constraints have
Is See J. HnsHLEIER, PmCE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 523-24, 548 (2d ed. 1980).
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taken many forms among which, for example, are the use of tax revenues
to provide welfare payments, or the cross-subsidization which occurs
when lifeline rates are imposed on utility taxpayers.
The following discussion principally concerns itself with the collec-
tive choices which benefit all members of a community. The paper con-
cerns moves from a non-Pareto state to a Pareto state. Because the theo-
retical literature is at such an early stage of development, the article does
not directly address the optimal mechanism of collective choice for deci-
sions involving choices between Pareto states involving redistribution of
income.1 ' However, the leading candidates to resolve such redistributive
decisions may include majority rule, and some of the suggestions regard-
ing improvements in voting to move to a Pareto optimal state may also
improve legislative majority rule decisions regarding the redistribution of
income. 15
Since Pareto optimality, subject to a legislatively determined distri-
bution of income, is the mode of welfare maximization that is practicable,
the legal structure and policies of transit should be directed toward this
end." But how is Pareto optimaltiy to be incorporated into transit struc-
ture? There are two operational conditions that must be fulfilled: alloca-
tive efficiency and the production of goods at lowest cost.
The first condition needed to establish Pareto optimality is called al-
locative efficiency. This is a difficult concept that will not be elaborated
upon at great length here. Briefly, an individual pursues only those ac-
tions in which the perceived benefits exceed the perceived cost.17 If each
person experiences a cost to himself for his actions which is the same as
the cost to society, then by normal decision making only those actions
with net gains to society will be undertaken. Those actions which result in
costs to society greater than benefits will be avoided, since the deci-
sionmaker sees a personal cost greater than the personal benefit.
For consumers and producers, this condition is generally taken to be
met when the price of a good equals its marginal cost, perfectly competi-
tive markets being assumed.18 Under perfectly competitive conditions, the
price which consumers are willing to pay shows the resource sacrifice that
the consumers are willing to make to obtain one more unit of a good, and
the marginal cost to the producer is the incremental cost that society
must incur to have an additional unit produced. Social welfare is said to
14 D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 270 (1979).
15 Id. at 265-66.
18 See P. LAYARD AND A. WALTERS, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 50 (1978).
17 "Benefits" are defined in the individual's mind, and can include altruistic feelings.
See D. MUELLER, supra note 14, at 245; Wolf, A Theory of Non-Market Failure: Framework
for Implementation Analysis, 22 J.L. & ECON. 197, 111 (April 1979).
18 See E. FERGUSON AND J. GOULD, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 456 (4th ed. 1975); P.
LAYARD AND A. WALTERS, supra note 16, at 14-15. Marginal cost is the addition to total cost
of a firm attributable to the addition of one unit of output. E. FERGUSON AND J. GOULD at
193. Perfect competition is defined in Ferguson and Gould at page 225.
[Vol. 6:1
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be at a maximum when the resource sacrifice which consumers are willing
to make exactly equals the resource sacrifice that society must make to
secure an additional unit of output.19
Application of the price-equals-marginal-cost criterion may not result
in net gains when there is a market failure and perfect market assump-
tions are not met.20 Market failures lead to divergence between the margi-
nal private costs paid by a private firm for the production of an addi-
tional unit and the marginal social costs or the resource cost to society of
that incremental unit.2
1
In the case of bus transit, there are a number of reasons to question
the perfect market assumption. For example, markets for the supply of
the major inputs to transit, like unionized labor, are not perfectly com-
petitive. The market for bus transit itself demonstrates significant market
failures in the form of externalities, 22 increasing returns to scale' s and the
public good nature of transit. 4 A solution to the optimal pricing of bus
transit that would comprehend these distortions and establish conditions
for allocative efficiency is, practically speaking, extremely unlikely.
Even though market distortions may prevent a rigorous solution for
consumers and producers to allocative efficiency in bus transit, the origi-
nal concept that each decisionmaker should be confronted with the mar-
ginal social cost of his or her actions is useful in analyzing both govern-
mental efforts to establish conditions for efficient allocation in the
presence of market failure and legislatively determined constraints that
have income redistribution effects.2 5 The question is whether a political
decision maker can be confronted with the marginal social cost of his or
her action in making these determinations. Clearly, given the magnitude
of the marginal social costs of many allocational efficiency measures re-
sponding to market failure and legislatively determined constraints, the
"E. FERGUSON AND J. GOULD, supra note 18, at 472.
20 Lipsey and Lancaster originally demonstrated that very little can be said about the
direction or magnitude of secondary departures from optimum conditions made necessary
by the original nonfulfillment of one of the conditions of Pareto optimality. Lipsey and
Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REv. EcON. STUD. 11, 11-12 (1956). More
simply, the theory states that "if one of the standard efficiency conditions cannot be satis-
fied, the other efficiency conditions are no longer desirable." P. LAYARD AND A. WALTERaS,
supra note 16, at 181.
2, See E. FERGUSON AND J. GOULD, supra note 18, at 473 and the definition of social cost
at 180.
" For a discussion of externalities in bus transit, see N. HAMLTON & P. HAMILTON,
supra note 2, ch.4 at 61.
2' For a discussion of returns to scale in the bus transit industry, see N. HAMILTON & P.
HAMILTON, supra note 2, ch.4 at 61.
24 For a discussion of the public good nature of bus transit, see N. HAMILTON & P.
HAMILTON, supra note 2, ch.4 at 61.
, 1 A. KAHN, THE EcoNoMIcs OF REGULATION: PRiNcIPLzs AND INsTrrTUONS 70 (1970).
Kahn points out that even though things elsewhere in the economy are not organized opti-
mally, policy supported by careful analysis and common sense may plausibly be expected to
yield improvements. There is no substitute for judgment.
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political policymaker cannot be directly assessed. However, the impact of
a policymaker's decision should in some way affect his or her personal
gains and losses. That is to say, if an individual policymaker makes a
decision that creates net social gains, that individual should experience
some personal gain. The same should hold true for losses. The reasons are
the same as before: every individual must face individual consequences
for his or her actions that reflect the consequences to society. If this is
true, the individual will only make decisions that are beneficial to society.
Unfortunately, since social choice theory is not very advanced, the
means to achieve this are not well specified. The key is the development
of non-market mechanisms for revealing individual preferences in these
situations. However, as one commentator points out, most economists ad-
mit that theory has nothing with which to instruct the choice of decision-
making institutions with respect to joint impact goods.26 Absent a theo-
retically rigorous model of social choice, the practical question of
confronting political policymakers with the social impacts of their deci-
sions remains. The voting process provides a very imperfect means of ac-
complishing this. Buchanan summarizes, "The electoral process offers, at
best, a crude disciplinary check on those who depart too much from con-
stituency preferences. Elections are held only at periodic intervals. Infor-
mation is poor, and citizens have relatively little private interest in secur-
ing more. ' '2
There are potentially many improvements that could be made in
confronting politicians with the social impacts of their decisions. Since
social choice theory is so imprecise, this is an area for future investiga-
tion. At this primitive stage, it is possible to put forward suggestions with
guarded confidence that their realization will contribute to the welfare of
those affected by a transit system. Buchanan's statement, for example,
suggests one simple improvement. The very heart of the issue seems to be
information to all actors in government enterprise, including voters, legis-
lators, regulators, and management. As pointed out by Friedman, "Those
who control and direct a governmental endeavor presumably base their
decisions on information. To be answerable is to generate and to supply
information. To hold others accountable requires that information be
available as a basic foundation for judgments."8
Because of the information and transaction costs of the voting mech-
anism, the best that can be accomplished is not voter sovereignty, but
voter control through the exercise of consent.2 ' Such consent must be rea-
28 A. SCHMID, PROPERTY, POWER AND PUBLC CHOICE 230-33 (1978). See P. LAYARD AND
A. WALTERS, supra note 16, at 44; D. MumLR, supra note 14, at 5, 270.
27 J. Buchanan, Why Does Government Grow? in BUDGESTS AND BUREAUCRATS: THE
SOURCE OF GOVERNMENT GROWTH 13 (T. Borchering ed. 1977). See J. HIRSHLEIFER, supra
note 13, at 469, (other imperfections of voring models).
18 B. FRIEDMAN, THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILTY 2 (1973); U.N. MEMO, supra note 6, at
17, 57.
29 P. Steiner, Public Expenditure Budgeting, in THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC FINANCE
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sonably informed. Voting with information to all actors provides a re-
ward-penalty mechanism by which policymakers can at least be made
more cognizant of the social gains or losses attributable to their decisions.
There will be a closer correlation between creating too large a net social
loss and the personal penalty of not being re-elected. The same increased
correlation will be seen between large social gains and the personal gain
of being re-elected or possibly advancing in elected position. It cannot be
overemphasized, however, that voting even with improved information
flow is an inaccurate device at best for confronting a political decision-
maker with the marginal social cost of his action.3 0
The second condition needed for Pareto optimality is the production
of goods at lowest cost.3 1 The problem is that no one knows the method
or methods which will produce at lowest cost, since no one has perfect
knowledge of all available production or management techniques. In addi-
tion, there are production and management innovations that will lower
costs but are as yet undiscovered. The best that can be done here is to
institutionalize procedures which encourage research and innovation, and
which penalize management which fails to improve upon the production
process.
Since no one person or group knows a priori the most effective
method of production, there must exist a number of persons or groups
offering alternative methods of production, available for evaluation by
both board and management. Second, to remove inefficient methods of
production, there must be a mechanism for elimination. This can be done
by the elimination of producers by some self-acting constraint. For exam-
ple, firms that cannot maintain a normal profit in a competitive market
eventually stop producing, whereas more efficient firms, those having nor-
mal or greater than normal profits, can continue production. The elimina-
tion of inefficient producers also can be achieved through elimination by
some nonautomatic mechanism. For example, this could be accomplished
by an agency that has evaluated the production process by using a per-
formance indicator. Finally, there must exist some source of innovation in
the production processes. Since innovation depends on new viewpoints on
how things go together, this variation can be achieved at least in part by
the introduction of new managements. There also will be variation in pro-
duction processes due to the remaining managements who are now faced
with the strong motivating force of the survival of the fittest.3 2 When new
254, 304 (1974).
30 See E. BROWNING AND J. BROWNING, PUBLIC FINANCE AND THE PmCE SYSTEM
(1979)(intermediate level discussion of public choice theory).
31 This is also called production efficiency or technical efficiency. See Leibenstein, Al-
locative Efficiency versus "X-Efficiency", 56 Am. ECON. Rav. 392 (1966); Posner, Natural
Monopoly and its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. Rzv. 548, 573 (1969). All these terms refer to the
best possible use of a firm's resources within the existing state of technology.
22 Cf. W. SHEPHERD, THE TREATMENT OF MARKET PowEr ANTITRUST, REGULATION, AND
PUBLIC ENERPRISE 202-03 (1975) (discussion of the role of takeover in stimulating manage-
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variations of production arise, the process of selection and further innova-
tion should begin again.
Creating these conditions for lowest cost production is obviously a
desirable goal for the legal structure of a transit system. The legal struc-
ture itself, rather than any further policy flowing from it, will then auto-
matically ensure lowest cost production.33 A structural means to obtain
the necessary elimination of inefficient producers and variation in produc-
tion processes is discussed later in the article.
B. The Definitions of Policy and the Production Process
A short review of the previous section would be useful. In the pres-
ence of market failure in the bus mass transit market, government may
undertake measures to remedy the market failures and establish condi-
tions for allocative efficiency. In making these determinations, the deci-
sion maker should be confronted with the marginal social cost of his ac-
tions. Marginal social costs are in turn a function of the individual
preferences of those in the community. As previously indicated, the social
choice literature discussing nonmarket mechanisms for revealing individ-
ual preference in these situations is not well developed. Voting with im-
proved information flow may to some degree be a mechanism through
which a political policymaker is confronted with the marginal social cost
of his action. To achieve a Pareto preferred position, the transit services
which are the subject of the allocative efficiency policies adopted should
also be produced at lowest cost.
The preceding discussion makes reference to both the policies ad-
dressing the allocative efficiency issue and the production process without
providing any focused definition of these terms." These definitions are
provided below.
Policy is defined as a course or method of action selected to guide
and determine present and future operational or managerial decisions.
These operational decisions constitute the process of production of
transit service. The policies that guide a system in large part determine
the system's impact on the area it serves. Policy can be directly stated
through a declaration of purposes in legislation creating or affecting the
enterprise. Policy can also be stated by agencies, the directives of which
are binding on the government enterprise.
For increased clarity, policy can be organized into four categories
that will be delineated and discussed here for reference. Policy is often
stated at such a high degree of generality that no one knows how to make
ment efficiency in private firms). In addition to the use of "sticks" for motivation of man-
agement, one could also use "carrots."
2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTrrUnONS 328-29
(1971).
" These definitions of policy and the production process may be used also to assist in
analyzing determinations relating to income redistribution.
[Vol. 6:1
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the policy operational without more discussion. For example, a system
may be directed to provide adequate and reliable transit service to meet
the community's needs. This type of ambiguous goal that provides no gui-
dance to management without additional elaboration will be referred to
as general policy.
Policy is also expressed in very specific terms as a level or constraint
with no flexibility in implementation. For example, systems have been
directed to have a load factor on local service at peak hours of not more
than 1.33 passengers per seat. Statements of policy that include specific
steps of implementation and offer no managerial flexibility will be re-
ferred to as stipulations.
It is quite questionable whether stipulations that dictate production
decisions are desired when achieving social goals. By the definition of
stipulation there is an implication that the stipulation is the best and
only method of attaining the social goals. It is a matter of experience,
however, that a "best" method is generally not the best unless there is an
explicit and formal proof of the superiority of that method. More often,
some agent with better experience of the matters at hand will come along
and discover a new "best" method. It is for this reason that stipulations
should be scrutinized for possible replacement by operating objectives as
defined below. The latter allows for creation of new approaches to a prob-
lem by the agents with the most experience, that is, the transit managers.
Frequently, policies direct management behavior by setting absolute
minimum and obvious standards of performance. For example, balanced
budget constraints are often imposed, and many systems are regularly au-
dited to ensure the integrity of general financial reporting. Because the
nonfulfillment of these types of policy indicates absurdly poor perform-
ance, these policies will be labeled constraints of the absurd.
Finally, policy can be put into an objective form that directly guides
management action, but allows for management expertise to choose the
optimal strategy to reach the objective. For example, the main priority of
a system may be to maximize passenger miles. This is the type of more
unambiguous policy that leaves flexibility in operational implementation;
it will be called an operating objective.3 5
The discussion above indicates the various types of policy. It remains
to define the difference between policy and the production process or day
to day management. In much of the British literature in government en-
terprise, it is simply assumed that a fine line can be drawn between policy
and day to day management.3 6 Even though the dichotomy between day
to day operations and policy determination is well recognized, it is not
enough to say only that broad policy decisions must be distinguished
3' See J. PRESSMAND AND A. WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION: How GREAT EXPECTATIONS IN
WASHINGTON WERE DASHED IN OAKLAND at xiv-xv (1973); Granger, The Hierarchy of Objec-
tions, 42 HARv. Bus. REv. 63, 66 (May 1964); Wolf, supra note 17, at 116-17.
36 W. ROBSON, NATIONALIZED INDUSTRY AND PUBLIC OWNERSHIP 139, 141-42 (1960).
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from transit operational decisions. With no clear distinction between the
two, supervisory agencies tend to encroach on the details of
management.3 7
Realistically, of course, there is no bright line separating policy from
operations. The two concepts merely are part of a spectrum of decision-
making which ranges from the most general questions of what service is
to be produced and for whom, to specific questions concerning marketing
or production. However, in order to reduce both the inherent ambiguity
in the concepts and the risk of interference in operations by policymak-
ers, a clear definition of the areas of management authority should be
delineated.
A possible approach to implementing this proposal would be to give
management sole control over all decisions that require detailed knowl-
edge of the production function and market characteristics. Dajani and
Gilbert note that transit efficiency is largely in control of operating man-
agement and is governed by the technical relationships between inputs
and outputs.3 8 This would include operational components such as main-
tenance, routing/scheduling, service characteristics, personnel matters, la-
bor relations, and promotional activity. These are essentially business de-
cisions in the ordinary course in the context of the private corporate
governance model.39
This division of responsibilities between the transit corporation
board and management clarifies to some degree the role of management
and the role of the board in the regulatory process. A simpler, more un-
derstandable structure should reduce information costs incurred both by
the board in monitoring management and by the community in monitor-
ing the board.
Policymakers should monitor decisions in the ordinary course on a
spot check basis, asking whether the process by which such decisions are
made is sound. As to extraordinary business decisions, like substantial
increases in capacity, or the recognition of a union, the policymakers
should have approval power. Decisions involving substantial changes in
the legal structure of the corporation should be referred to the commu-
nity for its approval.
C. The Sources of Policy
By definition of a government enterprise, a substantial degree of gov-
ernment control of policy is inevitable. The control of policy can be exer-
cised through legislation itself (for example by stating purposes in a sys-
tem's enabling legislation) as well as through numerous agencies whose
37 See N. Hamilton & P. Hamilton, supra note 2, at 110.
38 See Dajani and Gilbert, Measuring the Performance of Transit System, 4 TRANSP.
PLAN. & TECH. 97, 100 (1978).
3' For discussion on labor negotiations under contract management, see N. HAMILTON &
P. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 111-13.
[Vol. 6:1
12
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 6 [1983], Iss. , Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol6/iss/3
MASS TRANSIT
regulatory or fund granting power affect public transit directly or indi-
rectly. This policy control can emanate from the federal, state/provincial,
and/or local government level.
In the United States, examples of agencies at the federal level which
affect transit policy include the Urban Mass Transportation Administra-
tion of the Department of Transportation, the Department of Health and
Human Services, and the Department of Labor.40 At the state level, fre-
quently the state department of transportation plays a role in making
transit policy. At the local level, both the local government, and, if one
has been created, the transit authority itself are involved in formulating
policy.
In Canada, responsibility for policy definition is also distributed
among several levels of government, although the federal government
plays little or no role in the regulation of urban bus mass transit. Instead,
control is diffused among the Provincial Ministries of Transportation, the
regional governments if any, the municipal government, and the Commis-
sion itself.
The role of federal and state/provincial government in defining policy
should be relatively modest. Preferably, the principal role of these gov-
ernments should be to ascertain whether the legal structure adopted by
transit systems adequately provides for both the community preferences
in policies and the competitive pressures in transit management to
achieve those policies at the lowest cost. The federal and state/provincial
role will then principally in providing bloc grant subsidies and technical
assistance to transit systems as needed.41 There may be some policy is-
sues, like energy conservation or the prevention of racially discriminatory
practices, which are properly of concern to higher levels of government.42
However, if transit policy in these limited areas is to be dictated by fed-
eral or state/provincial governments, then it should be restricted to broad
statements of purpose and direction, earlier called general policy, leaving
the articulation of operating objectives to local policymakers. In particu-
lar, federal and state/provincial government should avoid the imposition
of stipulations on transit system.
There are a number of arguments, both theoretical and practical,
which strongly support this division in policymaking responsibilities. A
brief analysis of bounded rationality and information cost will assist in
laying the foundation for discussion of these supporting arguments.
No enterprise of any size, whether private or government, can be op-
4' Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1973, § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973); Urban Mass
Transportation Act of 1964, § 2, 49 U.S.C. § 1601 (1964); Urban Mass Transportation Act of
1964, § 13(c), 49 U.S.C. § 1609(c)(1964).
4' See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 42.
42 One proper area of federal concern, for example, would be to monitor compliance
with the Civil Rights Act to prevent material differences in quality of service to minorities.
See Wall St. J., Aug. 16, 1978 at 32, col.4.
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erated so that all decisions are made by those with direct legal responsi-
bility to shareholders or to voters. The rationality of decisionmakers is
bounded; that is, no one individual can possibly analyze and evaluate
carefully all decisions that must be made daily in any large enterprise.43
It also seems clear that in everyday life there is an opportunity cost
to the gaining of information; this is called information cost. It is evident
that perfect information does not exist. No one knows a priori how to
attain transit policies at an absolute minimum cost. However, it is plausi-
ble to assume that the closer a decisionmaker is to the market, the lower
the information costs of the data necessary for a decision. The precise
relationship of information costs and bureaucratic structure will depend
on the characteristics of the industry and the regulatory mechanism uti-
lized, but, in general, decisions made further from the market will suffer
from informational poverty. 44
It also seems pausible to assume that the closer a decisionmaker is to
the market (all other things being equal), the more responsive to chang-
ing market conditions the decisionmaker will be. Decisions made further
from the market suffer from response lag. It is axiomatic that business
conditions change continually and rapidly and that both informational
poverty and response lag lead to lost opportunities and higher costs."5
Regulatory intervention that requires a specified method of compli-
ance without flexibility to recognize differing circumstances involves high
degrees of informational poverty and response lag and leads to signifi-
cantly higher costs. This has been referred to as a stipulation. Regulation
that requires continuous monitoring or frequently changes requirements
also has a high incremental cost.4
Let us now see what information costs and bounded rationality imply
in terms of transit policy. Our earlier discussion stated that the purpose
of the legal structure of transit is to maximize the welfare of the people
affected by the system. Since the impact of transit decisions is almost
entirely local, the people most affected are the residents of the region
served by each system. The primary problems encountered in urban
transportation occur in the movement of passengers during peak hours.
'3R. SCHMALENSEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURAL MONOPLIES 15 (1979).
" See Eckert, On the Incentives of Regulators: The Case of Taxicabs, 14 PUB. CHOICE
83, 87 (1973); Jordan, Producer Protection, Prior Market Structure and the Effects of Gov-
ernment Regulation, 15 J.L. EcoN. 151, 174 (1972); Shepsle, Official Errors and Official
Liability, 42 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 35, 38 (Winter 1978)(Shepsle notes that "because of the
information loss that accompanies the transmission of information and judgments from
lower levels of the hierarchy to higher levels, the penultimate basis of a decision may be
misleading at best and erroneous at worst"). See also W. BAUMOL, WELFARE EcONOMICS AND
THE THEORY OF THE STATE 159-60 (1952).
45 See S. GOLDBERT AND H. SEIDMAN, THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATION: ELEMENTS OF A
MODEL CHARTER 7-8 (1953); J. THURSTON, GOVERNMENT PROPRIETARY CORPORATIONS IN THE
ENGLISH SPEAKING COUNTRIES 7 (1937).
46 ARTHUR ANDERSEN AND Co., ExEcUTIvE SUMMARY, COST OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION
STUDY 19 (1979).
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Congestion, pollution, and patterns of urban development are all local
concerns. Energy consumption is a national concern, but will best be
abated by a transit system responsive to local needs.47 Policy should,
above all, reflect the preferences of this community.
Transit planning and policymaking by centralized government agen-
cies will tend to ignore local preferences because of the combination of
attenuated voter pressure and the informational povery poverty and
bounded rationality of remote decision makers. Moreover policies formu-
lated at federal and state/provincial levels will tend to ignore intersystem
and dynamic variations.48 One commentator notes that "to centralize
adds to costs and sometimes detracts from the quality of the decision
itself. Thus, the more that has to be decided at the center of a large or-
ganization, the greater is the delay and the remoteness (and perhaps un-
clarity of vision) and the more likely it is that the decision will be taken
... by precedent."' 4' He concludes that a real optimum must involve flex-
ibility, local knowledge, and avoidance of bureaucratic structures. 0
Decentralization of policymaking to local levels has the additional
benefit of causing more information about the costs of government activi-
ties to be revealed to consumer voters.51 Both proximity to consumer vot-
ers and clarity of lines of responsibility will contribute to this result. With
regard to the latter, Friedman notes, "Especially with respect to transac-
tions between and among governments, understandings are mixed and
imprecise regarding the location and limits of responsibility and author-
ity. While they remain mixed and obscure, constituencies will find it ex-
tremely difficult to hold their governmental entities accountable.
52
It is predictable that the mere existence of multiple levels of policy
determination will obfuscate lines of responsibility, increase information
costs and decrease information flow, and cause the transaction costs that
all political actors, including voters, will incur in trying to control an or-
ganization. The organization thus will confront relatively less restrictive
external limitations.
5 3
Other problems can be anticipated from multilevel policy formation.
'7 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION: OPTIONS FOR FEDERAL
ASSISTANCE 13-15 (1977).
4" See N. HAMILTON & P. HAIULTON, supra note 2 at 35-36. For example, it is not at all
clear that the five percent federal government subsidy funds mandated for the elderly and
handicapped is optimal when, as one manager pointed out, some systems, such as Cham-
paign-Urbana, face a handicapped population of seven to eight percent of the total popula-
tions, while others, such as St. Louis, face three percent. For the five percent regulation, see
49 C.F.R. app. § 613.204 (1980). There should be variation in the policy to allow for varia-
tion in the system.
"9 A. NovE, EFFICIENCY CRITERIA FOR NATIONALIZED INDUSTmS 141-42 (1973).
so Id. at 139.
81 Auster, Private Markets in Public Good (or Qualities), 91 Q.J. ECON. 419, 427 (Aug.
1977).
" B. FRIEDMAN, supra note 28, at 8, 13.
Roberts, supra note 12, at 423.
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The involvement of multiple governments with different policy interests
and changing budgetary resources creates conflict and uncertainty for a
transit system when both policy and production planning depend upon
political vagaries at several levels. Long-run opportunities will thus be
foreclosed with consequent increases in transit costs.'
Finally, decisions from federal and state/provincial levels of govern-
ment are often incompatible with basic notions of efficient policymaking,
which require both that policymakers receive accurate feedback from all
those affected by a system and that conflicting political interests receive
the same relative weights in all decisions.8 5 In actuality, interest groups
generally concentrate their attention on a particular agency but many
others, whose interests are affected by a system, may be unorganized and
wield little or no political pressure. The influence of organized interest
groups seems to be relatively stronger as the policymaking agency is fur-
ther removed from the local transit systems area. The result is that fed-
eral and state/provincial policymakers receive inaccurate and unbalanced
signals which often bias policy in favor of interest groups.
D. Legal Structure at the Local Level.
The above discussion suggests a modest role for federal and state!
provincial government in the formulation of policy. Policy should princi-
pally seek to maximize the welfare of the local community affected by the
system. Consider how the legal structure of the transit system can accu-
rately reflect the preferences of the residents served by each system.
Since mass transit policy is just one part of urban transportation policy,
which in turn is part of urban development generally, the traditional view
has been "for control over the provision of all or most public services to
be centralized in a single jurisdiction of regional scope." 56 Under this
view, a properly defined metropolitan area is seen as a sort of "little econ-
omy," and transit policy is to flow from the transportation component of
the overall regional development plan.57 The regional development plan,
by this view, is to be formulated by policymakers answerable to the re-
gional community. A central forum would facilitate interaction of policy
participants and lead to a coordinated set of policies.58
What are the principal features of this entity which will first, define
4 For a discussion of these problems in the case studies See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMIL-
TON, supra note 2, at 33.
" See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 34; R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note
43, at 16.
" Warren, A Municipal Services Market Model of Metropolitan Organizations, 30 J.
AM. INST. PLANNERS, 193-94 (1964).
57 T. KUHN, PUBLIC ENTERPRISE ECONOMICS AND TRANSPORT PROBLEMS 40 (1962).
58 This is in part what the Metropolitan Planning Organization mandated by the Urban
Mass Transportation Administration was intended to do. See, N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON,
supra note 2, at 1.
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transit policy and operating objectives; second, perform the objectives;
and third, monitor and evaluate the performance of the objectives? The
theoretical literature, primarily of European origin, defines two principal
approaches to the design of a legal structure for a government enterprise.
One approach is for policy, objectives, and operations to be undertaken
directly by government in the form of a government department proper
or a subdivision of a government department. 9
Under this legal structure, direct responsibility for all matters de-
volves on the director of the department and ultimately on the chief exec-
utive of the government. Direct government control of operations is exer-
cised by executive order and legislative review. Personnel are usually
subject to civil service regulation. The enterprise is financed by annual
appropriations and is subject to the budget, accounting, and audit con-
trols applicable to other government activities. The enterprise frequently
possesses the sovereign immunity of the state. 0
A second more recent approach is to create a semi-autonomous legal
entity with a separate board sharing responsibility for policymaking with
the creator government. This semi-autonomous entity can be established
either in the legal form of a private company or as a public corporation.",
With a private company form, the enterprise is registered as a lim-
ited liability company under the corporation laws applicable to private
firms in the country.62 In company form, firm policy is determined by a
board of directors who respond independently to market conditions in
order to maximize profits in the same way that private firms are operated.
The principal differences are that the government selects the directors
and secures the benefits of the earnings.
3
The public corporation form encompasses a greater number of varia-
tions than the other two previously mentioned forms. The public corpora-
tion is not a government department because it has its own board of di-
rectors, accounts, and the capacity to sue and be sued in its corporate
name." Except for appropriations to provide capital or cover losses, a
public corporation usually is independently financed and is not subject to
the budget, accounting, and audit procedures applicable to government
departments. However, unlike the company form, the public corporation
is established by separate legislation and is subject to government control
" R. JAILE, MANAGEMENT OF STATE ENTERPRISES IN INDIA 71 (1976).
40 W. Friedmann, Government Enterprise: A Comparative Analysis in GOVERNMENT
ENTERPRISE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, 308-09 (W. Friedmann and J. Garner eds. 1970); U.N.
MEMO supra note 6, at 6.
41 U.N. MEMO, supra note 5, at 5.
" For a discussion of company form as utilized by the Indonesian government, see R.
Prasetya and N. Hamilton, The Regulation of Indonesian State Enterprises in LAW AND
PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN ASIA 165-68 (International Legal Center ed. 1976).
"W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 60, at 310-12; R. POZEN, supra note 12, at xx.
" W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 60, at 310-25; R. PozEN, supra note 12, at xx.
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as provided in the statute.6 5 There are many variations on the public cor-
poration theme. Some public corporations are very similar to the depart-
ment form and some corporations resemble quite closely the company
form.
The question remains which of these principal models of governance
is optimal for a transit enterprise. With respect to the task of identifying
and articulating the preferences of individuals affected by a transit sys-
tem, the directly elected regional officials in charge of a department form
enterprise would appear to be best informed as to community preferences
concerning transit. The strength of this premise is abated by the informa-
tional poverty of city officials regarding transit. The city council, in par-
ticular, lacks organization, expertise, time, and interest to cope with the
complexities of transit. The Banks Report observes that members of city
council must divide their time over an extremely wide field of complex
issues."6
Although a department form enterprise may enjoy some advantage in
the formation of responsive policies, this form has serious problems in
translating this policy into operating objectives and performance criteria,
and ensuring lowest cost operations. The task requires of policymakers a
capacity for independent counsel in business matters and a knowledge of
transit operations. Operations, of course, demand full time work and in-
side knowledge of the business. The government department model in-
creases the risk that these tasks will be delegated to a bureaucracy which
lacks these essential characteristics. Indeed our earlier discussion indi-
cated that bounded rationality and information costs lead to informa-
tional poverty and response lag on the part of the decisionmakers. 67
Problems of informational poverty and response lag have historically
been evident in department form enterprises. Serious shortcomings of de-
partments, in Jaile's view, are both the failure to get correct information
and act on it, and the lack of flexibility necessary to give initiative and
enterprise full reign.68 Departments tend to be impervious to change be-
cause of red tape and bureaucracy.6 9
61 U.N. MEMO, supra note 6, at 9.
66 R.L. BANKS AND ASSOCIATES, STUDY AND EVALUATION OF URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION
REGULATION AND REGULATORY BODIES, VOL. I: SUMMARY AND MAIN REPORT 83 (1972). Man-
agement of one system operated as a department noted that the mayor's staff also may have
divided attentions and lack transit knowledge. To be sure, dramatic issues or events may
inspire interest in transit on the part of the council or mayor, but its incidence will be
uneven and unpredictable. The less informed the policymaking agencies, the less policy will
reflect either community preferences or the realities of transit operations. See Mashaw, Civil
Liability of Government Officers: Property Rights and Official Accountability, 42 L. & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 8, 24 (1978).
67 See discussion at notes 42-45 supra.
" R. JAiLE, supra note 59, at 43-44, 81-82.
69 R.L. BANKS AND AssocIATEs, supra note 66, at 83.
This lack of responsiveness was noted by Thurston, who comments:
A government department is notoriously poor at adaptation. Hampered by parti-
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Rigid rules for the purchase of supplies, placing of contracts, and
promotion of personnel are examples of stipulations inherent in govern-
ment department activity. These rules conflict with accepted commercial
practices and hamper response to the market.7 0 As an early U.N. report
notes, it is theoretically possible to endow a government department with
a high degree of operating flexibility, but in practice it is difficult to do so.
"As long as an enterprise is not clearly differentiated from other types of
governmental activity, strong pressures will be brought to bear to make it
conform to standard government regulations and procedures .... ,7
This analysis suggests that the government should create a separate
policymaking board under either the private company or public corpora-
tion model. Company form can be disposed of quite quickly. The general
incorporation laws prescribe forms of organization, financing, and super-
vision not particularly well adapted to a public institution.7 2 The chief
advantages of the private corporation form-limited liability, pooling of
investment, transferability of securities, perpetual existence, and share-
holder supremacy-have little meaning for a government entity.7 3 More-
over, since it operates independently of the government, with profit max-
imization as a motive, the company form will present problems of
defining policy and operating objectives and possible lack of control. Op-
erating as a transit monopoly, the firm will also face inadequate competi-
tive pressures.
This leaves the public corporation form. The autonomy from govern-
ment control implicit in this form is intended to address the problems of
informational poverty and response lag apparent in the department form.
The key question concerns governance of these corporations. What is the
optional mechanism for definition of policy and operating objectives and
assurances of efficiency?
E. Optimal Elements of a Transit Corporation
The first paragraph of this section stated that the ideal legal struc-
ture for a transit system is one which maximizes the welfare of all people
affected by a transit system. Later discussion assumed this would be ac-
complished through the articulation of policies by policymakers con-
san control, operating on a fixed yearly budget, bound by rigid rules governing its
purchases, accounting, expenditures, and personnel, unable to borrow on its own
responsibility to provide for new capital equipment or to expand working capital
quickly, embarrassed by immunity from suit and other legal rules affording special
privileges to the government which destroy commercial confidence and make it
impossible to carry on business in accordance with the usual commercial practice,
the government department is a failure as an entrepreneur.
J. THURSTON, supra note 43, at 7.
7* U.N. MEMo, supra note 6, at 6-7.
71 Id. at 8.
72 H. SEMMAN, supra note 3, at 99-100; U.N. MEMO, supra note 5, at 18.
"S R. JAILE, supra note 59, at 77.
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fronted with the social impact of their decisions and by the performance
of these policies at lowest cost.
The principal improvements suggested to confront policymakers with
the social impacts of their decisions were voting for policymaking posi-
tions with better information to voters and decentralization of policymak-
ing to local levels. Thus in the model local policymakers bear responsibil-
ity for policy formation. In order for these policies to reflect community
preferences, the community must be informed as to how local policymak-
ers exercise their power to formulate policy. Policymakers should be di-
rected to formulate a statement of policies to facilitate the flow of infor-
mation to the community. Clearly, a "laundry list" of general policies will
not suffice to inform either the community or the operating management
adequately of the type of output that is desired. General policy of course
provides little direction to, and almost no control over, management.
Management can trade off policy goals as it desires.
In order to direct management, and to inform the community, the
statement of general policy should be translated into clear and unconflict-
ing operating objectives.7 4 Since it is the movement of passengers, not
empty seats, that is the output of a transit system providing utility,7 5 the
operating objectives of a system should be passenger mobility objectives.
As one commentator points out, passenger mobility can be measured in
many ways. The simplest way, for example, is the proportion of people
that travel and the distance traveled on any given day.76 This type of
aggregated mobility measure may not satisfy the general policies of a sys-
tem relating to, for example, reduction of congestion or to specific income
redistribution policies concerning the handicapped. A more refined ap-
proach would be to translate the general policies into desired levels of
mobility for defined groups." For example, in order to effect a policy of
reduction in congestion, the correlation between increased transit use by
commuters and reduction in congestion must be ascertained. The appro-
priate amount of congestion abatement must be determined; the corre-
sponding increase in passenger mobility for commuters thus becomes an
objective of the system.78 Mobility defined in terms of the movement of
targeted groups also captures the goal of accessibility of the system, since
the achievement of a certain movement objective cannot be reached un-
less the system is accessible.
The objectives will thus be stated essentially in terms of desired
74 R. MUNDY, MASS TRANSIT GUIDELINES VERSUS A CONSUMER ORIENTATION IN PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2 (1977) (unpublished).
71 See Dajani and Gilbert, supra note 36, at 97, 99. See also G. FIELDING AND R.
GLAUTHIER, DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOCATION OF TRANSIT SUBSIDIES IN CALIFORNIA 15 (1976).
76 A. TOMAZINIS, PRODUCTIVITY, EFFICIENCY AND QuALrY IN URBAN TRANSPORTATION SYS-
TEMS 179 (1975).
77 Id.
78 ARTHUR ANDERSEN AND CO., PROJECT FARE TASK IV REPROT, TASK AND PROJECT
SUMMARY 1-3 (1973).
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levels of movement for different groups of the population, such as com-
muters, the elderly, youth, low-income people, or residents of certain geo-
graphical areas.79 Some policies, such as reduction in congestion, may be
easier to state in mobility terms than others, such as management of ur-
ban growth. However, each objective should be viewed as a hypothesis
concerning the relationship of movement of various passenger groups to
the general policies. The relationship between the groups' mobility and
the policy may not occur in reality as hypothesized. Therefore, the setting
of objectives will be a trial-and-error process, and mobility objectives will
be redefined from time to time as experience is gained.
The mere statement of clear general policy and operating objectives
provides information to the community and directs management efforts
but does not provide a basis to measure the adequacy of management's
performance. There must also be a means by which to measure the rela-
tive degree of attainment of the objectives by management.8 0 If objectives
are defined without any method of measuring performance, evaluation is
subjective and calls forth only the minimum threshold effort that man-
agement believes will satisfy the review. Objectives whose performance
criteria define expected performance levels in specific measurable terms
would provide this measurement capability.81 Criteria are essentially
scaled operating objectives. Achievement could be defined by increases in
the movement of handicapped, for example. However, high achievement
in terms of the scaled criteria does not alone measure the performance of
efficiency of management. The question arises, at what cost was the mo-
bility criteria reached? Transit efficiency is thus the lowest cost produc-
tion satisfying any given level of a mobility objective.8 2 The discussion to
follow outlines a means of approximating efficiency in transit operations.
A first condition of cost minimization is the definition of clear oper-
ating objectives and performance criteria. Simplicity is desirable, since
the fewer the policies and objectives, and the fewer the decisions in im-
plementation and supervision, the more likely the policy will ultimately
be realized. 8 Implicit in clarity is the caveat that the objectives must also
be consistent.
Assume that clear and consistent objectives and performance criteria
have been framed. Management autonomy is a second critical condition
for cost minimization. Local policymakers cannot work out cost minimiz-
ing production strategy. This requires full-time work and inside knowl-
7R. WINNIE AND H. HATRY, MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LocAL GOVERNMENT
SERVICES: TRANSPORTATION 1, 59 (1973).
,o D. CooMmEs, STATE ENTEmRiSE, BUSINESS OR POLImCS? 167 (1970).
• The board must establish tentative criteria in the form of standards for measuring
the success of the broader objective. These are the yardsticks to measure the success of the
stated objective. The more tangible such yardsticks are, the more usable they will be.
Granger, supra note 35, at 68-69.
" Dajani and Gilbert, supra note 38, at 100.
'* J. PRESSMAN AND A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 35, at 143.
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edge of a business, its markets, its products, and its technologies. Man-
agement is in the most informed position to make resources productive in
the pursuit of the enterprise's objectives.8 " Stipulations dictated by
policymakers lead to uninformed and unresponsive production decisions
and consequently to waste and to lost opportunities. 5 Therefore, if man-
agement lacks the freedom to follow its own production strategy in pursu-
ing operating objectives, it cannot be expected to achieve the lowest cost
production.
Clear objectives and criteria and management autonomy are neces-
sary conditions, but are not in themselves sufficient to ensure lowest cost
production. Government enterprises with monopoly franchises are not
subject to competitive pressures to minimize costs. Without such pres-
sures, these firms can waste resources through managerial slack and iner-
tia, which includes incurring costs in excess of those which a competitive
firm would, and dampening incentives for invention and innovation.
Therefore, the third necessary element for efficiency is the existence of
competitive pressures on management to perform the objectives at lowest
cost. These are the conditions of lowest cost production discussed earlier.
The question is whether the valuable characteristics of market solu-
tions can be retained to spur management of a public corporation. 6 The
optimal result would be a market with a number of unfranchised suppli-
ers (either government and/or private enterprises) striving to offer the
best product or service in question, including competition for available
subsidy dollars. This outcome would be ideal because each producing firm
would face the same environment, and selection among them would be
automatic by virtue of profit performance and free entry. The normal op-
timal competitive result would apply here.
If the minimum optimal scale of the government enterprise is large
relative to the size of the market, resulting in few producers, the efficien-
cies that occur from competitive pressures may be attenuated by oligop-
oly distortions.8" If the market is so small that only one producer can
achieve minimum optimal scale, there is no competition at all.
Of course if the market could consist of a number of unfranchised
suppliers competing with one another, private production may be more
efficient. Even if a market is such that only one firm theoretically pro-
duces at lowest cost, it may be more efficient for private enterprises to
contract for the opportunity to operate a monopoly franchise for a num-
ber of years. If there exist a number of private producers willing to bid at
each contract renewal then private production may be significantly more
" Drucker, The Real Duties of a Director, Wall St. J., June 1, 1978, p. 20, cols. 305.
85 See 44-45, supra (information costs).
86 Wolf, supra note 17, at 136.
87 See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 151-69
(2d ed. 1980).
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efficient than public production."8 More work needs to be done in transit
to answer these questions. However, as indicated in the introduction, our
purpose here is not to answer the question whether government enter-
prise, properly designed, is a preferable alternative to private enterprise
alternatives, but rather to focus on the issue of the optimal institutional
design for public enterprise in transit. Whether or not government enter-
prise is justifiable on theoretical grounds, in actual practice, many public
corporations, including nearly all those in the mass transit industry, oper-
ate as monopolies.8 '
Given the predominance of public ownership by monopoly, competi-
tion could be effectuated in two ways: (1) intercity competition could be
introduced by comparing performance among systems; or (2) competition
could be created for the opportunity to manage the firm. This latter ap-
proach would not be possible either with government firms that directly
employ outside management or with a public purchase and leaseback to a
private firm. However, a contract management scheme is amenable to
management competition.
Consider first the possibility of creating competitive pressures by
comparing management performance among transit systems. The princi-
pal obstacle to making such comparisons is that transit monopolies do not
sell in the same market and consequently do not face the same conditions
of demand and cost. Therefore, the cost differences may not be attributa-
ble to managerial competence.' 0 An attempt must be made to factor out
the influence of these differences in conditions. In addition, the relation-
ship of costs to policies cannot be ignored. Some types of service, for ex-
ample, service to the transportation disadvantaged, may be more costly
than other types. Transit costs are thus in part a function of both operat-
ing objectives and an awesome number of factors other than managerial
competence. These include, to name but a few, population density, road,
traffic, and parking conditions, demographic characteristics, the character
of the labor force, climate, and topography.' 1
The possibility exists that regression analysis can be refined to ac-
commodate all these differences in objectives and other influences on
costs. However, it is not a practical means of introducing competitive
pressure for transit management for several reasons. The skills needed to
carry out complex regression analyses of this type are in short supply. It
would be better not to do it at all than to do it badly. Even if the techni-
' See, e.g., the discussion of competitive conditions in mass transit and the possible
efficiency of franchise bidding in N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 67-69.
See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 71.
Posner, supra note 31, at 628.
' PUBLIC TECHNOLOGY, INC., PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
TRANsrr PERFORMANCE, Norfolk, Virginia 39 (1978). Paradoxically, having just pointed out
the relationship of costs to policies and objectives, Fielding and Glauthier recommend com-
parisons among systems on the basis of efficiency indicators. G. FIELDING AND R. GLAUTHIER,
supra note 75, at 34-35.
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cal skill were available, the initial analysis would be extremely costly and
it would be costly to update. Management would dispute the methodol-
ogy used, thereby raising the costs.
Most important, however, there are institutional limits to what
policymakers can understand and implement. As Posner points out, "An-
yone who believes that a fruitful direction for forward movement in regu-
lation is toward increasing the amount of data and the sophistication of
the conceptual apparatus used in arriving at regulatory judgments is ig-
noring the lesson of experience.""2 Posner's conclusion finds some support
in the fact that state public service commissions do not seem to be utiliz-
ing the regression models developed for electric utilities by several
economists.9
3
This leaves the possibility that competitive pressures could be intro-
duced by having contract management firms bid for the opportunity to
manage the transit system. In order to create competition among contract
management firms, the board must set clear objectives and performance
criteria. The objectives should be relatively few in number to facilitate
maximization by the firms and performance review by the board. The
available bloc grant subsidy and plant and equipment should be deline-
ated. Complete data on the system's previous operations should be availa-
ble to all bidders. Contract management firms can then make manage-
ment proposals, including a budget outlining what performance levels can
be obtained with the revenues available from subsidies, taxes, and the
farebox. The specific procedures to be followed in the award of the con-
tract are outlined in Governance of Public Enterprise. The bottom line is
that the board selects that proposal which commits management to the
highest levels of performance in terms of the criteria. The contract would
provide for a base payment if all criteria were met within the budget. In
order to prevent the budget from being exceeded, relatively severe penal-
ties should be assessed for failure to stay within the budget. Scaled penal-
ties also should be provided for failure to meet criteria. If performance
exceeds the contractually agreed terms, scaled rewards should be granted.
A comprehensive review at the end of each contract period would be
necessary to determine whether the criteria, including the budget con-
straint, have been satisfied. The review should be focused on determining
the degree of satisfaction of the performance criteria, not on remaking
any of the decisions of management.
Any form of continuous review should be avoided. If the board seeks
assurance during a contract period that management is performing ade-
quately, the board can spot check as to whether performance criteria are
being met in selected areas. If errors are clearly apparent, further inquiry
should be made, and the board should be empowered to terminate man-
92 Posner, supra note 31, at 629.
'3 See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 104 nn. 69-71 (discussion on the
use of regression analysis in utilities regulation).
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agers on short notice following a hearing.
The effectiveness of the contracting process should improve over
time. Each subsequent round of comprehensive review and contract nego-
tiations should provide feedback to assist in examining policies, objec-
tives, and criteria.
The introduction of bidding for recurrent short-term management
contracts has a number of attractive features. Without having several
competitive proposals to review, the board has little idea how challenging
the objectives and criteria will be to accomplish. The competitive ap-
proach should determine the highest level of performance believed possi-
ble with the available revenue. In other words, policymakers will know
what is feasible at the level of subsidy available.
Second, even if perfect bidding parity at contract renewal is not at-
tained, the existing management firm is subject to credible survival
threats that will spur performance." The fact that rival groups of share-
holders in a private corporation may at times seize capital is thought to
be a powerful incentive to management efficiency."
There are other advantageous features. This approach to lowest cost
production is considerably simpler and more effective for the board and
management than engaging in management audits and other constraints
of the absurd. The board's attention is properly focused on policies, oper-
ating objectives, and criteria. Once criteria are set, the monitoring of
management performance poses relatively few problems of data collection
and interpretation. Management is relieved from the burdens of generat-
ing a number of reports. As pointed out by a manager of one medium-
sized system, when people are filing reports, they aren't doing anything
productive. Inadequate managerial performance also should be quickly
apparent and could continue no longer than the duration of a short term
contract.
The effectiveness of the contracting process should improve over
time. Each subsequent round of comprehensive review and contract nego-
tiations should provide feedback to assist in examining policies, objec-
tives, and criteria.
A contract management approach also avoids the political roadblocks
that traditionally make transit management posts unattractive to manag-
ers. Both salaries sufficiently high to attract top management talent and
incentive compensation schemes to elicit superior performance are possi-
ble in a private firm context.
A brief summary of the major optimal elements of a public corpora-
tion would be useful at this point. In the model, policymakers are to for-
mulate a statement of policies reflecting the appropriate social opportu-
nity costs (and income redistribution constraints). Policymakers must
ensure these policies are realized at lowest cost. In order to achieve this,
" Roberts, supra note 12, at 421.
" W. SHEPHERD, supra note 32, at 202-03.
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policymakers must translate their policies into a few unconflicting operat-
ing objectives, not stipulations, framed in terms of the production of util-
ity. Utility only arises from the movement of passengers. The operating
objectives allow for flexibility in policy and can be granted to create per-
formance indicators to measure the degree of accomplishment of the
objectives. Articulation of operating objective and performance indicators
allows management to exercise sole control over the decisions that require
detailed knowledge of the production process. These are operational com-
ponents, such as maintenance, labor relations, routing, scheduling and
promotional activity.
All the preceding measures make possible the implementation of con-
ditions to spur realization of the policies at lowest cost. The introduction
of bidding by contract management firms for short term contracts will
both define what it is possible to achieve with the measures available and
make more likely its accomplishment at lowest cost. All these features
will hereafter be referred to as the transit corporation model.
III. TRANsrr EXPERIENCE COMPARED TO THE IDEAL MODEL
The case studies were undertaken primarily to outline the models of
institutiinal design being used by the systems surveyed and to determine
whether there existed a generally accepted model of governance. The in-
quiry was also to provide insight into the practical problems of existing
models. In section IV, we consider the political acceptability and practi-
cality of modifying existing models of governance to conform to the ideal
model presented above.
Case studies of the U.S. transit systems documented considerable di-
versity in legal structure among them, strongly suggesting that there does
not exist in the United States a generally accepted model of governance
for government enterprise in mass transit." It would serve little here to
illustrate this lack of a widely accepted theory with exhaustive detail.
-However, one point should'be emphasized. The case studies indicate that
not only is there lacking any generally accepted model among the seven-
teen, but also in many individual systems there is considerable ambiguity
concerning the type of legal model intended by the legislature. Three of
the seventeen systems included in the study are clearly government de-
partments. Of the remaining fourteen created legislatively as separate
transit authorities (public corporations), five are clearly modeled on the
private corporation implying significant management autonomy in opera-
tional matters. Four are labeled municipal corporations implying close
bureaucratic control over policymaking and operations. The nature of the
legal entity created is left undefined in the other five, providing no model
of how policy is to be determined and operations conducted.97
"See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 11-16 nn. 6-61.
97 See id. at 13-14, for example, in Ohio, the statutory language directs that a regional
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The results of the Canadian studies were consistent with those in the
United States. Although some systems adhered reasonably closely to one
of the paradigm forms of public enterprise discussed earlier,"8 others
showed diverse characteristics which made classification difficult. For ex-
ample, many systems resembled public corporations on paper, but in
practice were operated like a department of the local government because
of the relevant funding system.'9 Finally, one system was historically
structured like the private model, but in fact was run like a department
of the local government. 100
Within this diversity of legal structures, there are several common
problems. The first applies only to the United States. The concept dis-
cussed earlier that local transit policy should flow from an overall regional
development plan has not been realized in the United States. 10 1 If any-
thing, conflicts in policy and planning uncertainty have been exacerbated
by the strategies of many local governments to gain advantage. Many
long term opportunities are thus foreclosed with consequent increases in
transit costs.
There were also severe problems of multiple level policy determina-
tion in the United States. To take an example, in Pennsylvania, the State
Department of Transportation has published an exhaustive list of stan-
dards "for which exact compliance is expected."'1 2 The allocation of state.
mass transit funds is based on the degree to which transit agencies adhere
to these standards.103 The standards specify in great detail production
characteristics concerning network structure, transporting capacity of-
fered, headways, speed, reliability of service, comfort and convenience,
and fares. For example, regarding vehicle capacity at peak, the depart-
authority is a political subdivision of the state and a body corporate with all the powers of a
corporation. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 306.31 (Page 1979). In contrast, the Champaign-Urban
Mass Transit District is labeled a municipal corporation. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, § 353
(Smith-Hurd 1966). Legislation creating the systems in Indianapolis, Fort Wayne and Gary
provides no guidance as to the type of entity created except that it is a "public transporta-
tion corporation." IND. CODE ANN. § 19-5-10 (Burns 1974).
' The systems in Montreal and Hull were legislatively structured and run according to
the public corporation model. The Mississauga system operated as a department.
" This conflict was particularly evident in the systems in Kingston, Oshawa, and
London, and to a lesser extent it was observed in Ottawa and Toronto.
100 The Hamilton system still retained a share structure with all shares owned by the
regional government.
101 See notes 52-54 supra. During the 1960s, the federal government attempted to solve
the problem of coordinated planning among the many local communities in a metropolitan
area by requiring the creation of a regional Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) as a
condition to qualify for federal transit subsidies. The expectation that the MPO would coor-
dinate and improve the planning of urban development and transit policy has in large part
been disappointed. See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 16-18, 94-96.
l01 PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTuENT OF TRANSPORTATION, OPERATING GuIDELINES AND STAN-
DARDS FOR THE MASS TRANSPORTATION ASsISTANCE PROGRAM 7 (1973).
10, Id. at 24. Note, however, that in actual practice only flagrant violations of the guide-
lines may be penalized.
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ment directs, "Vehicle capacity for each quarter hour shall be determined
as 5 square feet per passenger on a travel length not exceeding 15 min-
utes."1 4 New routes are not to be added unless approved by the depart-
ment.10 5 As pointed out in previous discussions, stipulations like these are
undesirable because of lack of flexibility. In addition a program occurs
since some managers at the operating agency level placed blame for their
system's troubles on policies arising from one or more levels above them.
The ability to shift responsibility was particularly serious in the interac-
tion between management and the local transit board and other local
policymakers. The ability of management to shift responsibility for condi-
tions to a higher level weakens the accountability of management to local
policymakers. Similarly, local policymakers can use the same excuse to
the local community, and therefore, the accountability of local policymak-
ers to the community is diluted.10a
At the federal level in the United States, there are several good ex-
amples of decisions which conflict with the basic notions of efficient local
policymaking discussed earlier in Part Il. Pressures from organized labor,
the elderly, and the handicapped have been particularly effective in elicit-
ing policy from the federal government in the form of stipulations
favorable to their interests. For instance, in section 13(c) of the 1964 Ur-
ban Mass Transportation Act there is a guarantee that the position of
employees would not be worsened as a result of a federal subsidy.107 The
result is that for any particular action, the benefit to overall transit ser-
vice must be ignored if labor might be hurt. It makes no difference if
there is a large benefit to nonlabor and a small loss to labor. Section 13(c)
precludes the action.10
Perhaps the most significant difference discovered between the
transit systems in the United States and Canada was observed in this
area. In Canada, there is little or no federal involvement in urban mass
transit. Moreover, very few goals are set at the provincial level, and those
that are set are not in the form of stipulations, but rather, economic goals
expressed in budgetary terms. Indeed, in Ontario the provincial govern-
ment has recognized the desirability of local control, and funded studies
specifically designed to deal with local transit needs. Sensitivity to local
10 Id. at 9.
106 Id. at 10.
206 In general, the costs of political accountability to the community will be higher and
its extent lower if control by constituencies requires coordinated action at several levels of
government. See Roberts, supra note 12, at 423.
101 Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, § 13(c), 49 U.S.C. § 1609(c)(1976). Similar
stipulations exist favoring the elderly and handicapped. See N. HAMLTON & P. HAMITON,
supra note 2, at ch. 2 nn. 149-58. Note that this not only illustrates political imbalance but
also no guarantee of efficiency. However, in this case there is even a less result- guaranteed
inefficiency.
105 For discussion of the same issue with regard to the elderly and handicapped, see N.
HAMITON & P. HAMILTON, supra 2, at 34-36.
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needs was also recognized in Ontario when regional government was in-
troduced. Municipal transit systems within the region were not obliged to
become regional systems; this decision was left to management, and a
provision for voting systems was made in th6 legislation to reduce any
conflict between and among the participating communities should they
join a regional system.
In addition, we did not observe any policies formulated to benefit
particular subgroups, as had been observed in the U.S. studies. No poli-
cies favorable to labor were observed, and policies favoring the elderly
were adopted, if at all, at the local level. Provincially funded programs
designed to assist the handicapped were separately funded and
administered.
In addition to the severe problem of multiple level policy formation
in the U.S., a second common problem is that the systems have failed to
articulate policy which unambiguously, reflects social goals and allows
measurement of management's fulfillment of those policies. The U.S. case
studies revealed that the exact opposite of what is desired has actually
occurred. If policies of a social niature were articulated at all, they were
usually general policies, using ill defined as well as undefined terms such
as "welfare", "adequate", and "suited to the need". In fact, in nine sys-
tems no formalized policy guidance was provided by either the enabling
legislation or by decisionmakers at the operating agency level. In the
other eight systems, even when general policy was articulated it usually
took the form of a "laundry list" with no indication of the policies' prior-
ity. Only a handful of the systems in the study had attempted to further
define general policy in terms of operating objectives.0 9
Policy that was not vague usually bypassed what were called operat-
ing objectives, which would give management direction with flexibility on
production decisions, and dictated operational matters which can reason-
ably be considered only the domain of management. In other words, too
many stipulations were used. Operating objectives and stipulations can
both be useful when directing social policy, but in most of the studied
cases stipulations dictated such things as routes, loading standards, head-
ways, and the like.1 0 The board also frequently tended to concentrate not
on policy but on operational transactions such as the approval of the pay-
ment of bills and negotiated contracts. While perhaps not stipulations,
these decisions are still essentially operational decisions.
When the transit system had no policy to guide management or when
only general policy was articulated, the result in the case study systems
was that the budget allocated the resources available and implicitly sets
objectives.""' Defining policy through the budgetary process has serious
drawbacks. The actual policies being pursued will be obfuscated, and
109 See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 18 n. 75.
1 See id. at 24 n. 106.
1 See id. at 25-26.
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outside evaluation by voters or appointing authorities will be inhibited.
Most critically, the budgeting process tends to be accretionary and does
not take a comprehensive view of the mission of the system and the final
effects desired. The balancing and planning necessary for maximizing the
change in welfare are absent. Due and Friedlander point out that existing
programs are not reviewed in detail in the preparation of a budget. "The
presumption is that existing activities will continue unless there is strong
evidence that their existence should be reconsidered.' 1 2 "There should
be comparison of the relative merits of various requests. The traditional
presentation of material in a budget does not facilitate this task."11 3
When the boards fail to guide management, the old maxim "Having
lost sight of the objectives, we redoubled our effort" comes into play.11'
The mode of operation in systems without policy was described by one
manager as "firefighting." That is, whenever an externally imposed emer-
gency occurs, the system chases after a solution trying to fulfill its obliga-
tion. Generally by the time one "fire" is out, another "fire" is created by
another regulatory body or by public demand for service. Busywork itself
becomes a goal. Some systems become so accustomed to this mode of op-
eration that when there is no fire to put out, employees sometimes come
to the office and have no idea of what to do for the day.
Again, the results of the Canadian studies were similar. Although in-
stances of all four types of policy discussed earlier were found, general
policy 21 5 or stipulations1 6 dominated. In no case were operating objec-
tives specified in the governing legislation, and in some cases the legisla-
tion contained no policy directives whatsoever." 7 Only in Toronto and
Halifax were policies which could be termed operating objectives identi-
fied, and in both cases these had arisen at the local government level.'1'
These first two problems may in part be attributable to a third short-
122 J. DUE AND A. FRmDLANDER, GOVERNMENT FMNANcm ECONOMICS OF TIE PUBLIC SEC-
TOR 133 (1977).
13 Id. at 138.
114 Granger, supra note 35, at 63. See N. HAMLTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 27-
28.
2,5 For an example at the legislative area see the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto
Act, R.S.O. 1970, ch. 295, § 104(a) which says the Commission shall plan for transportation
"so as to serve best the inhabitants of the Metropolitan area." For an example at the system
level, consider the comments of the Ottawa systems interviewee, describing the system's
goal as "public service to the community."
I" The interviewee of the London system described the system's goals as "service
within mile of the residential areas and maximum headways of 30 minutes until 6:00
p.m."
2" There is no legislative policy in the acts governing the systems in Kingston, Missis-
sauga, and Ottawa.
21 In Toronto, the system was cooperating with the local government to encourage de-
velopment in certain areas of the city by putting subway routes there. In Halifax, the system
and the city were cooperating to reduce traffic on the two bridges connecting the city to the
surrounding area.
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coming common in the systems in the United States. The studies indi-
cated a failure in many U.S. systems to achieve the board/pol-
icy-management/operations distinction which was suggested earlier as
ideal.11' In part, this may be explained by the difficulty of capturing the
theoretical distinction in a legislative instrument. In other cases the
board, perhaps due to its members' lack of transit or even business exper-
tise, seemed to unduly rely upon management for policy development and
as a supply of information concerning performance. 20 The same pattern
was observed in the Canadian interviews: management taking the initia-
tive in the areas of budget, service, and planning, followed by routine ap-
proval by the board. Only in the Hamilton system were planning initia-
tives observed to emanate from the board.
It appears that because of these factors, the boards in many of the
case studies are only titularly carrying out their policymaking and moni-
toring functions. That is, even though the policy statement may appear to
be written by the board, it is actually transit management who designs
the policies, and the policies are rubberstamped by the board with minor
or no alterations. If policy is formulated implicitly through the budget
process, the problem of management's cooption of policymaking function
is even more apparent. In many of the systems, budgeting is a highly in-
ternalized management process with few changes made by the board after
the budget is presented for approval. In some cases the board has never
adjusted a budget proposed by management. Even the data provided for
purposes of monitoring the budget and evaluation of management per-
formance are basically a product of management initiative.1 21
It appears that in most systems in Canada and the United States,
management plays the principal role in articulating policy, in formulating
the budget, and in providing the data base for its own evaluation. This
arrangement quite seriously reduces the meaningfulness of both policies
and evaluation since one cannot expect management to design policy or
to monitor its success in achieving it without taking its own possibly in-
consistent self-interest into account. In fact, it is fair to conclude that in
many systems management has co-opted the process of planning, deter-
mining policy and monitoring implementation by virtue of its control
over planning, personnel, and information.1 12
In view of the observations about policy definition, a fourth short-
coming, the general lack of institutionalized procedures or indicators for
evaluating operational performance, is not surprising. In .neither country,
did the studies reveal a transit system with a mechanism to guarantee
movement toward more efficient production, nor were there any truly ef-
"I See notes 36-37 supra.
120 See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMLTON, supra note 2, at 26-27.
121 Id.
12, In particular see the discussion of the relationship of the board to management in
Toledo and Columbus described in N. HAMImTON & P. HAMMTON, supra note 2, at 26.
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fective standards of excellence against which management could be mea-
sured. This is of extreme concern. Without these conditions, observations
on "efficiency" are meaningless. It is irrelevant that management appears
efficient, or that management vows it is producing at lowest cost. No one
is sure that another manager could not do the job better (that is, more
efficiently). Without an assurance of relatively efficient production, exces-
sive costs are difficult to detect.
It is clear that the state of the art of management in transit is rela-
tively unadvanced. For example, even though the budget is a weak check
on management, in most systems the adequacy of management perform-
ance is generally measured in the first instance by management's adher-
ence to the budget. This control over management is supplemented by a
number of lesser constraints, generally absurd. For instance, all the sys-
tems in the study utilized audits by an outside auditor to prevent over
obligation and to ensure both the financial representations are correct
and operations are in accordance with prescribed requirements. In a few
systems, performance audits by consulting firms are also required. The
audits are backed up by regular, usually monthly, reports prepared by
management for the board. The reports are intended to enable the board
to monitor management performance. This is explicitly stated by the Ak-
ron board, which directs the general manager to provide monthly operat-
ing statements to the board reflecting the prior month's activities and
"progress." 128 "Progress" is not defined. The information provided by the
reports is of limited value in assessing management performance. The
Banks study notes that the reports now in use were designed to ensure
honesty of general financial reporting in an era when financial speculation
and manipulation were characteristic of the transit industry.2 4
In another example, the principal focus of the monthly report of the
Columbus system is to inform the board concerning variances from the
budget so as to flag the possibility of not meeting the balanced budget
constraint. Comparisons of cost and revenue between the previous year
and the current year also are included. 1 5 Similar reports are made availa-
ble to the boards in other systems.
No significant differences were observed in Canada. All systems were
audited by an outside auditor and were subject to audits by the provincial
and local governments. The interviews indicated that management's per-
formance was intimately connected with its ability to adhere to the
budget, and in fact this was mentioned as one of the system's main goals
in a number of interviews. Budgetary constraints were invariably set by
the Board, but these can only be regarded as constraints of the absurd. At
the time the study was conducted, it was impossible to determine
whether the Ontario government's funding incentive system will produce
123AKRON METRO REGIONAL TRASIT AuTHoRrry, RULES AND REGULATIONS § 4.3 (1974).
114 R.L. BANKS & AssociATEs, supra note 66, at 24.
C25 TRAL Qmo TRNSIT AUTHORITY, REVENUES AND EXPENSES (1977 and 1978).
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any significant changes.126
A last check on management performance is the imposition of bid-
ding requirements on contracts let by the system. Normally the board
reviews all contracts on which bids are required. Most systems in the
study have contract bidding requirements. In one major system, the gen-
eral manager stressed board approval of contracts as a more important
control on management's financial discretion than budget review. How-
ever, this comment gets more to the weakness of the budgeting and re-
porting requirements as a means of directing and monitoring manage-
ment than to the strength of the contract bidding requirement in
accomplishing these goals.
The set of checks on management just discussed leaves much to be
desired. All are designed to prevent gross management abuse rather than
to guarantee lowest cost production. In fact, the case studies generally
indicated few pressures on management to perform efficiently. The ap-
praisal process is highly subjective and probably depends more on politi-
cal than business considerations. One commentator, noting the extreme
difficulty of transit boards in appraising management performance, sug-
gests that "the board at best has only a subjective intuitive grasp of man-
agement performance. 1 27 Under these conditions, management may well
perceive political activity as more rewarding than increasing the efficiency
of the system. These checks on management are, therefore, essentially
constraints of the absurd. As long as management meets the budget and
is not involved in public scandal, it appears secure. For those few boards
which attempt to make their general policies more precise, the result is
usually just a tightening of the absurd constraints resulting in a slightly
clearer sense of poor performance.
In summary, transit studies support two major general observations.
First, despite the different origins, and different political and economic
climates, urban mass transit systems in the United States and Canada
exhibit relatively few significant differences. The greatest differences ob-
served were related to the more active influence of the federal and state
governments and special interest groups in the United States. This is a
significant advantage for Canadian transit. Although there are significant
differences at the state, local, and system levels within each country, the
range of phenomena observed in both is virtually identical. Secondly, the
systems in both countries bear little or no resemblance to the ideal transit'
model posited earlier. This suggests either serious deficiencies in the
model itself, or in the manner in which these vital government enterprises
are presently operated. In the next section we attempt to reconcile the
ideal model with some of the practical difficulties observed in the studies.
2,. See appendix, at L
127 Horn, Transit Boards, Part II: How Do They Work? 3 TRANSIT J. 51, 67 (Fall
1977)[hereinafter Horn, Part I].
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IV. THE TRANSIT CORPORATION MODEL IN PRACTICE.
Earlier discussion in Section II developed the transit corporation
model. 128 In Section III our inquiry turned to the practical problems of
existing diverse models of governance for transit. We can now turn to the
question of refining the transit corporation model to account for these
practical problems.
It has been suggested that policy should primarily reflect the prefer-
ences of the local region affected by a transit system. A regional develop-
ment plan including a transit component should be formulated by policy-
makers answerable to the regional community.12 ' However, as the
discussion in Section m makes clear, comprehensive metropolitan plan-
ning has largely been a disappointment.8 0 Since regional land-use plan-
ning has played an insignificant role in the systems in the United States,
the board of the transit corporation still has the "bottom line" responsi-
bility to determine transit policy, develop operating objectives and per-
formances criteria, and monitor management performance. Because of the
inability of the regional planning institutions in the United States to
compel compliance with regional development plans, responsibility for
transit policy must be carried by the transit corporation board without
benefit of an obligatory coordinating regional plan that is binding on all
local governments. Obviously if effective regional planning were possible,
this is a preferred alternative since the policy conceptions of the transit
corporation board do not necessarily incorporate any perception of the
development preferences of the entire region.
Section III also pointed out critical shortcomings in that transit poli-
cymaking bodies are failing (1) to articulate clear policy, operating objec-
tives and performance criteria; (2) to respect the distinction between
board control of policy and management control of production; and (3) to
ensure lowest cost production by management. It was also observed that
in many systems in the United States, management has co-opted the poli-
cymaking process and their performance evaluation.
Of course in theory the provisions of the transit corporation model
outlined in section II should remedy these problems. In the model, policy-
makers are to formulate a policy statement, operating objectives, and per-
formance criteria, and management is to be assigned all decisions that
require detailed knowledge of the production function. 31, The introduc-
tion of bidding by contract management firms suggested in the model will
increase competitive pressures on management. It would be advisable
that the structure creating a transit corporation actually spell out these
Is See discussion of notes 74-95 supra.
"I See discussion at notes 56-57 supra.
130 See discussion at notes 101 supra.
131 See discussion at notes 38-39 supra.
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provisions.131
All of these proposals seem possible to implement given present con-
ditions in the bus transit industry. In particular they are simple and are
already in use. In the past several years, contract management has been
increasingly utilized in the transit industry. As of 1979, five contract
management firms provided management services to a total of sixty-six
urbanized areas to operate their transit systems.23 3
Implementing the characteristics embodied in the transit corporation
model will improve both allocative efficiency and lower costs of produc-
tion. It will clearly define both the board's role in expressing the welfare
function in terms of operating objectives and performance criteria, and
management's autonomous role in implementing a production function
that will satisfy the criteria. Moreover, these conditions, combined with a
means of introducing competitive pressures on management, will increase
efficiency. However, the incorporation of these proposals into a statutory
scheme may not in itself ensure their effectuation. Statutory directives
and admonitions, no matter how carefully drawn, may not be sufficient to
prevent a board or management from misapprehending the model or
making other errors in judgment. It is a reasonable assumption that the
legal structure and the minimization of error in determining policy and
monitoring management are inextricably linked, since it is the structure
of the board which in large part defines the information available, the
competence and motivation of the board, and the decisionmaking proce-
dure. From this assumption several suggestions will be made and dis-
cussed below.
The board performs the roles of identifying and aggregating the pref-
erences of the individuals affected by transit, formulating responsive poli-
cies, translating this policy into operating objectives and criteria, and en-
suring conditions for cost minimization. To minimize error, a board must
be qualified to undertake these functions.
Consider first the task of defining policies that reflect the preferences
of the people. This requires a knowledge of the local community. Some
U.S. systems in the study used a geographic representation on the boards
on the assumption such board members would have more intimate knowl-
edge of problems in the local area represented.2" In the Montreal system,
no geographic representation as such was demanded of board members,
but council members from within the City of Montreal chose one commis-
sioner to represent city interests, and councilors from outside the city
chose one commissioner to represent the interests of residents outside the
city. In Hamilton, for example, the commission was composed of five
members of regional council representing the City of Hamilton, and four
members of regional council representing the remaining area.
132 See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 111-12.
133 See id. at 108-09 (current procedures for awarding management contracts).
12 See e.g., Cleveland, Ohio, Ordinance 2380-B-74 (December 30, 1954).
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The task of translating policies into operating objectives and per-
formance criteria requires of the board a capacity for independent council
on business matters and a knowledge of transit operations. One commen-
tator observed that in addition to independence, a director should possess
three attributes: first, a familiarity with the management of complex or-
ganizations, knowledge of corporate business and finance, and sensitivity
to social policy; second, the ability to raise unpleasant questions without
alienating other board members or management; and third, a willingness
to spend the time necessary to do the job.135
The operation of the model depends on the board's being both inde-
pendent and unbiased in its tasks. One commentator notes that directors
must have no interest regarded as incompatible with their duties. 3 6 In
order to maintain board autonomy, some systems prohibit elected officials
from serving as board members.
13 7
Board members must also have sufficient knowledge to execute their
tasks.13 8 Although a high degree of knowledge concerning any of the three
areas-community preference, business matters, or transit opera-
tions-contributes greatly to each board member's utility, a minimum
skill level in all three is essential. Since few members of the community
are knowledgeable about transit, it should be mandatory for board mem-
bers to receive training on transit operations.1 3' Because it is a sufficient
challenge for any system to educate its board on transit operations, board
membership should not be an occasion for remedial work in the areas of
general business and financial knowledge or community familiarity.
Board members with business backgrounds can absorb transit informa-
tion much faster than those without experience. The potential benefits of
improving the educational level of board members are many, "Not the
least of these" suggests one commentator, "will be the relative facility
and speed with which well-educated appointees can pass through unpro-
ductive initiation periods. Staff domination of commission proceedings
will also be increasingly unlikely."" 0 This suggests that minimum qualifi-
135 Solomon, Restructuring the Corporate Board of Directors: Fond Hope-Faint
Promise, 76 MICa. L. REv. 581, 603 (1978).
1s J. THURSTON, supra note 45, at 159.
'" This is the position taken by the Ohio Attorney General in interpreting the state
enabling legislation for transit authorities. 73 Op. Att'y Gen. 016 (1973). This position was
also found in Canada in the enabling legislation for the system in Hull, Quebec.
1 Solomon, supra note 135.
139 Of the systems in the study, only Columbus had a regular workshop on transit is-
sues. Chicago RTA trustees are encouraged to attend CTA transit management programs.
Horn found less than nine percent of board members had experience in transit, and most of
this was very limited. Horn, Transit Board Members: Who They Are and What Do They
Do, 2 TRANSIT J. 15, 20 (Nov. 1976). None of the systems in Horn's study had any training
program. Id. at 29. In Canada, commissioners of the Toronto Transit Commission attended
conferences, although not as frequently as management staff did.
140 T. PELsocI, THE ENERGY Cssis AND THE NEw BREED OF REGULATORS: A STUDY OF
STATE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONS, 7 (1979) (accepted for publication in MmwEsT REv. PUB.
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cations for board membership should include residency in a community
for several years, as well as some education or experience in business or
financial matters.
Board specialized expertise can be further developed through a com-
mittee structure, wherein each committee focuses on an interrelated
group of issues. In addition, a committee approach is often a more effi-
cient method of operation than full board participation. Such a structure
existed in all but one of the U.S. systems in the study. The Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) has favored the establishment of a strong
committee system as one method of strengthening the independence of
private corporation boards and enabling the boards to better serve corpo-
rations in an overseeing capacity.14' Governance of Public Enterprise sug-
gests a committee structure involving the creation of an audit committee,
a management contract committee, and a performance measurement
committee.
1 42
The model anticipates that board members will be working partici-
pants in formulating policy, not peripheral participants who confirm or
ratify decisions. In order to attract and motivate qualified board mem-
bers, board members must be adequately compensated. 143 A possible
yardstick in determining adequate compensation is the stipend offered to
directors of similarly sized private corporations in the system's area.'
44
The level of performance expected of a compensated board is justifia-
bly higher. Legislation should direct the board to undertake training in
transit and set an'attendance requirement at committee and board meet-
ings. One commentator uncovered three transit authorities that have at-
tendance requirements."4 Any attendance below, for example, 80 percent
of meetings would be cause for removal.
A combination of minimum qualifications, a committee structure,
compensation, obligatory attendance, and training in transit should in-
crese the competence and motivation of the board and reduce the
probability of error. The objective is that the board be knowledgeable,
not experts. In addition, the board itself is incapable of screening and
interpreting vast quantities of raw data about the system. The board's
capacities must be supplemented by a planning staff with the time and
requisite technical knowledge both to assist in carrying out the planning
process that ultimately yields the performance criteria and to measure
AD.).
141 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, PROPOSED RULES RELATING TO SHAREHOLDER
COMMUNICATIONS, SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN THE CORPORATE ELEcToRAL PROCESS AND
CoRoRATE GOVERNANcE GENERALLY, 293, 297 (July 18, 1978).
2 See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 116-17 m. 126-29 (discussion of
committee structure for the transit corporation).
I's Tecson, The RTA in Northeastern Illinois, 56 Cm. B. REc. 318, 326 (1975). The
Chicago CTA and RTA provide substantial salaries to directors.
14 R. JAELE, supra note 59, at 203.
145 Horn, Part II, supra note 127, at 61.
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whether the criteria have been achieved. 1"6
Specifically, the planning staff can collect and analyze information on
community preferences and internal and external constraints, develop re-
sponsive and rationalized policy alternatives among which the board can
choose, and draft performance criteria for the objectives set by the board.
The board must be brought into the planning process at a sufficiently
fundamental level so that they have a full understanding of the final
choices.147
As indicated in Section III, in many systems the board depends on
management staff for the planning and internal auditing input. In the
instance of the internal audit function, management views internal audit
as an operating mechanism to aid in administering the business in the
most effective manner. However, the audit committee of the board views
the internal audit as a protective device to check compliance with com-
pany policy and government regulations, safeguard assets, detect fraud,
and to maintain the integrity of the company. There is a conflict between
the two functions; the same internal auditors cannot serve both functions.
The audit and performance committees should have an internal auditing
staff separate from managements internal audit staff. 14
Similarly, in the instance of the planning function, management
views planning in terms of formulating, coordinating, and evaluating the
various elements of the production function. The Banks Report notes
that reliance on management for information will result in transit costs
and transit revenue consuming the agency's attention, not the mobility of
the population.149 The board's committees see planning from the broader
perspective of the welfare function as the critical element in the process
leading to performance criteria and the determination of adequacy of per-
formance. Conflicts of interest are apparent when the management plan-
ning staff puts forward objectives and performance criteria and measures
its own performance. Indeed, in some systems where management con-
trols the planning staff, it appears to co-opt the entire process of objective
setting, to control the information flow to the board, and to prevent any
effective monitoring of its activities. For example, earlier discussion noted
that many systems had (1) no objectives or only objectives proposed by
management with board "rubber-stamp" approval, (2) information flow
to board controlled by management, and (3) ineffective checks on man-
agement performance.
The independence and freedom from bias in policymaking and moni-
toring which the model requires of the board are called into serious ques-
1,6 R.L. BANKS AND ASSOCIATSS, supra note 66, at 343.
17 Granger, supra note 35, at 71. See N. HAMLTON & P. HAmLTON, supra note 2, at 19
nn. 138-39.
148 See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 119 n. 140 (discussion of poten-
tial conflicts of interest for audit staff).
14 R.L. BANKS AN AssocuTms, supra note 76, at 107.
[Vol. 6:1
38
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 6 [1983], Iss. , Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol6/iss/3
MASS TRANSIT
tion when the board relies on the management planning staff. The board
must have its own staff to provide the planning and determination of
objectives, the design of performance criteria that direct management to-
ward accomplishment of the objectives, and the evaluation of manage-
ment's success in meeting such criteria. The staff should conduct both
spot-check and comprehensive reviews. In smaller systems, planning as-
sistance for the board can be provided by outside consultants. In the
event that short-term management contracts are adopted, another practi-
cal reason for having board planning is evident: the board planning staff
must take responsibility for the long-term planning of investment.
Earlier discussion in Section H established that it is essential for po-
litical decisionmakers to be cognizant of the social gains and losses attrib-
utable to their decisions. This cognizance is, in large part, a function of
political pressure. If decision makers perceive their tenure as contingent
upon identifying community preferences and meeting them at lowest cost,
policy will reflect those preferences more closely. The transit corporation
model requires that the community must both be informed as to the poli-
cies adopted and the level of efficiency achieved, and be able to rectify
inadequate board performance. Voting was suggested as a very imperfect
method of confronting political policymakers with the social impacts of
their decisions. 150
However, discussion later in Section H pointed out that directly
elected officials like city council members lack organization, expertise,
time and interest to cope with the complexities of transit.51 This in-
creased the likelihood that city council members were not qualified to
articulate transit policy, translate it into operating objectives and per-
formance criteria, and ensure lowest cost operation.
As is evident from the earlier discussion, the question whether the
transit corporation board should be elected or appointed is an extremely
difficult one, and has no certain answer. The discussion following sheds
more light on these issues.
The populist preference for direct election of public officials, includ-
ing judges and regulatory commissioners, is based on the view that the
inevitable political influence in any appointment process should be
avoided. The argument is that the very fact that selection has to be made
by some political authority permanently injects politics into the matter.
Therefore, the shift from an elective process to an appointive one results
in transferring the matter from an overtly political arena to one where
politicking is more "clubby" than it should be because it is less visible to
the public. The elective process, as poor as it might be, is then, always to
be preferred to an indirect method of selection that is not necessarily rep-
resentative of the people who have to abide by the governmental
o See discussion at notes 26-30 supra.
's See discussion at note 66 supra.
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decisions.'52
Direct election is also thought to result in shorter tenure in office.
Shorter tenure is considered desirable for public officials, since "more is
lost by long continuance of men in office than is generally to be gained by
their experience.' 153
The assumption that the elective process leads to selection of officials
representative of the people may be questioned, however. The electorate
does not have sufficient knowledge of planning and production function
problems to have a clear notion of board competence.254 Unless glaring
inadequacies are manifest, the community will probably have little
knowledge of board performance. The value of incumbency at the time of
reelection also suggests that elected boards are not answerable to the
people. 15
5
Even if it is assumed that a direct election may yield board members
who are more responsive to the community, elected board members may
not possess the capacity to give independent counsel on business matters.
This lack of expertise may inhibit the board from implementing the con-
ditions necessary for the lowest cost production. The failure to achieve
the lowest cost production function decreases the community welfare,
which the board is directed to maximize, and which is a principal reason
for adopting a transit corporation form in the first place. For example, in
a survey of elected and appointed public utility commissions in the
United States, one commentator found clear evidence that rates were
substantially higher under elected commissioners than under appointed
ones.1
5 6
Given the current evidence, it would be preferable to create a mecha-
nism to ensure that the factor of competence is incorporated into the
choice of board members. Appointment to the board by elected local offi-
cials on the basis of qualifications has a higher likelihood of satisfying the
model's condition that a board be competent.
Two checks can help prevent the appointment of an unqualified and
unbalanced board. First, the media will play a major role in monitoring
the qualifications of appointees. In addition, an advisory group should be
legislatively created to help appointing authorities screen candidates'
qualifications. Such committees, appointed by the legislative branch, can
12 Heggs, Merit Selection of the Ohio Judiciary: An Analysis of S.J.R. 6, and a Propo-
sal for Implementation, 28 CASE W. RES. L. Rpv. 628, 638 (1978). See also, T. PELSoCr,
supra note 140, at 14.
13F. MOSHER, DEMOCRACY AND THE PUBLIC SERviCE 62 (1968).
1 See Heggs, supra note 152, at 644.
See id. at 645; T. PELSoCI, supra note 140, at 10.
T. PELSoCI, COMMISSION ATrRrmuTEs AND REGULATORY DISCRETION: A LONGITUDINAL
STUDY OF STATE PUBLIC UTnrrY COMMISSIONS 22 (1978)(unpublished). See also R.
SCHMALENSEE supra note 41, at 89, 92 (discussion of the expertise needed to supervise gov-
ernment enterprise). Schmalensee also finds some evidence that regulatory performance is
better with an appointed commission rather than an elected one. Id. at 62.
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assist in providing public scrutiny of the competence of appointees. If the
appointing officials must choose from panels of candidates approved by
the committee, the advisory committees also can seek to achieve some
balance in representation. Several systems in the study already have citi-
zens' advisory committees that could be used for this purpose.
The next question is whether an appointed board, once in office, is
answerable to the community for its actions. Critics charge that ap-
pointed boards are insulated from public opinion and are unresponsive to
the community.157 The 1954 U.N. Report also noted that removal from
political pressure may mean that significant political power lies in the
hands of a small unrepresentative, and, in extreme cases, self-perpetuat-
ing group controlling public corporations. 1'"
Measures which can be taken to correct these tendencies must be
discovered. The success of any system of rewards and sanctions depends
on both adequate information reaching an official's superiors-in this
case the appointing authorities and the community-and the ability of
the superiors to bring sanctions to bear on the official. Given an ap-
pointed board, the challenge is to discover an incentive scheme that di-
minishes a board's isolation from public pressure and forces the board to
be responsive.
Several checks on the board may contribute to this end. The most
direct check is through the appointment process. In order to encourage
responsiveness to community preferences, it may be advisable to appoint
board members to fixed terms, but maintaining removability at will by
the appointing authorities. Long tenure on a board can also lead to iner-
tia. More frequent turnover could contribute to greater openness to inno-
vative proposals and increasing sensitivity to the social (not only eco-
nomic) dimensions of regulation. In order to ensure regular turnover,
consecutive terms of service should be limited.
Another check contributing to answerability is evident. To the degree
that local governments provide a significant subsidy to the system, board
decisions are checked in the annual appropriations process of the local
governments. If the board's actions are not approved by local govern-
ments, the subsidy may be reduced. However, the effectiveness of legisla-
tive supervision, which one commentator observes to be "uneven and un-
predictable," may also be questioned."
In any case this check is weakened to the degree the transit corpora-
tion receives earmarked tax revenue and need not rely on local subsidies.
Earmarking also impairs the utility of the governmental budget and de-
creases legislative flexibility in adjusting expenditures to meet the chang-
ing conditions. This weakening of review of the board and increased
governmental fiscal rigidity must be balanced against the several possible
157 A. WALSH, supra note 3, at 3, 6.
U.N. MEmo, supra note 6, at 11.
"' Mashaw, supra note 66, at 24.
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benefits of earmarking taxes.
The first of these is the possibility of lower costs. The grant of
earmarked tax revenue to the transit corporation may increase business
efficiency because such will cause a reduction in both uncertainty with
regard to system revenues and the possibility of local government inter-
ference in operation. 160 Another benefit is noted by one commentator who
maintains that earmarking tax revenues gives the individual voter greater
voice in government spending. 161 There is thus the possibility that tax
increases earmarked for transit may receive stronger public support than
tax increases for general state activity. On balance, since the rationale for
using the public corporation form is increasing business efficiency,
earmarking tax revenue for the transit system makes sense. Eleven of the
U.S. transit systems in the study already enjoy this advantage.
Judicial review may play a role in determining whether the board has
acted within the discretion delegated to it. However, as Governance of
Public Enterprise points out, this is an extremely limited check on board
action.1 62
Two other factors which can be viewed as checks on an appointed
board are the competence and professionalism of the board. The greater
the board's competence and professionalism, the greater will be the credi-
bility an appointed board enjoys. Several elements may contribute to
building public confidence in the board. Clear lines of responsibility that
are easily understood by the community will aid credibility. The qualifi-
cations of the board in terms of community and business experience and
the avoidance of even the appearance of impropriety generate public con-
fidence. A separate planning and auditing staff for the board will also
contribute to this perception of board impartiality.
Affecting both the accurate reflection of preferences of the commu-
nity and the achievement of the lowest cost production function is the
question of information to the public. The community must be informed
to be able to monitor policymakers. The community relies primarily on
the media for information concerning policies adopted and the level of
business accountability attained. This is a principal structural check on
the discretion of the board. Guaranteed access to information is a neces-
sary condition in order for the media to fulfill this role.1 63 In addition to
media coverage, open meetings may lead to wider dissemination of infor-
mation and encourage increased attendance, greater preparedness, and
better organization at meetings by board members.
160 J. MAXWELL AND J. ARONSON, FINANCING STATE AND LocAL GOVERNmENT 223 (3d ed.
1977); J. THURSTON, supra note 44, at 140, 256.
161 Buchanan, The Economics of Earmarked Taxes, 71 J. POL. ECON. 457-86 (1967). See
Auster, supra note 51, at 427-28.
162 See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 125-28 nn. 173-98 (discussion of
judicial review of the decisions of government corporation).
163 The effectiveness of media coverage of the operations of government firms appears
to have received little scholarly attention.
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Of course, a host of arguments have been advanced for limiting the
openness of governmental decisionmaking. These are summarized in Gov-
ernance of Public Enterprise. 1  A degree of interference may simply
have to be accepted, since the media are a critical check on the discretion
of the board. A middle ground, whereby both board and committee meet-
ings are presumed open with certain exceptions, may strike an acceptable
balance. Open-meeting legislation in several states permits executive ses-
sion for personnel matters like employment or discharge; matters involv-
ing contract negotiations, particularly collective bargaining and negotia-
tions on the sale or purchase of real estate, where premature publicity
would be detrimental to the community; and for matters involving the
attorney-client privilege."' These exceptions, and the fact that in the
transit corporation model business corporations are unlikely to be im-
peded since they are clearly delegated to management, should more than
offset the impact of the public interference mentioned above.
V. SUMMARY
These observations suggest that the governance structure of an urban
mass transit system should be designed to pursue two ultimate goals: the
articulation of the preferences of its community and the satisfaction of
those preferences at lowest cost. The transit corporation model presented
in Section II seeks to address both of these objectives. Discussion in Sec-
tion III established that in actual practice transit systems in the United
States and Canada demonstrate similar severe shortcomings both with re-
spect to the two ultimate objectives and in comparison with the transit
corporation model. The principal advantage of the Canadian transit sys-
tems in comparison with the U.S. systems was the absence of substantial
federal involvement and very little provincial involvement beyond provi-
sion of a subsidy. In Section IV, we presented some concrete recommen-
dations to bridge the gap between the transit corporation model and the
actual operation of the transit system revealed in the case studies.
On the whole, although the systems in both Canada and the United
States deviate greatly from the ideal model, substantial improvements in
the public transit industry can be effected relatively easily. We hope some
of our suggestions will lead to a more cost-efficient transit industry which
is responsive to the needs of the communities which it serves.
' See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 128-29 nf. 204-07 (discussion of
sunshine laws in the context of public enterprise).
1" See Little and Tompkins, Open Government Laws: An Insider's View, 53 N. CARo-
LINA L. REV. 451, 475 (1975); Recchie and Chernoski, Government in the Sunshine: Open
Meeting Legislation in Ohio, 37 OHIO ST. L. J. 497, 508 (1976); Note, The Iowa Open Meet-
ing Act: A Lesson in Legislative Ineffectiveness, 62 IowA L. REv. 1108, 1125, 1128 (1977).
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APPENDIX*
For the purposes of this article, case studies of ten mass transit sys-
tems in three Canadian provinces were undertaken. The information col-
lected came through interviews with representatives of the system during
the summer of 1978 and through a review of relevant planning docu-
ments, financial reports and legislation. All references to governing legis-
lation or local conditions are to those we found in 1978.
Transit systems were selected from only three provinces due to cost
and time constraints. The systems in Ontario, being the most geographi-
cally accessible, were chosen in order to reflect a varying range of popula-
tion levels and urban transit conditions. Systems in Quebec and Nova
Scotia were added for purposes of comparison with the Ontario systems.
The information which follows is a brief overview of the data collected on
the Canadian systems studied, and gives the factual basis for comparisons
made in the article.
I. ONTARIO CASE STUDIES
In Ontario, as well as in Quebec and Nova Scotia, the federal govern-
ment had little or no involvement with municipal transit. The provincial
government and the local governments (municipal or regional) funded
transit according to a series of guidelines set down by the provincial Min-
istry of Transportation and Communications. The guidelines took into
account the fact that larger systems incurred less of a deficit, and set out
target farebox revenue/operating cost ratios for different levels of popula-
tion served. For example, Group 1 Cities (less than 100,000 population)
were expected to make a 50 percent revenue/cost ratio, Group 4 Cities
(over 1,000,000) top make a 72.5 percent revenue/cost ratio. Of the re-
maining amount, the province would pay half and the local government
half.
However, the funding system included an incentive for high revenue/
cost ratios. If the transit system could achieve a revenue/cost ratio higher
* The authors would like to extend their thanks to the following representatives who
gave us their help: Hector Chaput, General Manager OC Transpo, Ottawa; J.B. Annand,
General Manager, Oshawa Public Utilities Commission; J.K. Fee, General Manager, King-
ston Public Utilities Commission; J.A. Little, Asst. General Manager, Hamilton Street Rail-
way Company; Peter Travis, Planning and Research Manager, Mississauga Transit; M.C.
Ecker, Planning Director, London Transit Commission; William G. Frost, Statistical
Economis and William Heywood, Director of Marketing and Public Relations, Toronto
Transit Commission; Pierse Caron, Chairman and General Manager, Outaouais Regional
Community Transit Commission, Hull; J.J. Bouvrette, Treasurer and Executive Assistant of
the Montreal Urban Transit Commission; Thomas McKim, General Manager, Halifax
Transit.
All figures are from the Canada Year Book, 1978-79, Statistics Canada, taken from the
1976 census. Census Metropolitan area figures are given where applicable. It these figures
are not applicable, Incorporated City or Town figures are given.
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than the target, the province would continue to pay the same subsidy,
thus reducing the local government's share of the cost. If the transit sys-
tem made less than the target ratio, the province paid the same amount
and the local government's share increased. Therefore, the local govern-
ment had a strong incentive to make sure the transit system achieved a
high revenue/cost ratio.
Other subsidies given under provincial legislation included a seventy-
five percent subsidy of all capital costs, and a "start-up" subsidy for the
operating costs of the first year of a major transit facility. There was also
a seventy-five percent subsidy of a "transportation needs study report"
and a subsidy of all the costs of an experimental project. Apart from any
policies implied in these subsidies, the province had little formal transit
policy; a "low bid" rule on contracts had been introduced but was not
enforced.
II. SYSTEMS STUDIED IN ONTARIO
Population
1. Kingston 56,032
Kingston Transit was operated by the city's Public Utilities Commis-
sion under a city by-law passed in 1963.
2. Oshawa 107,023
Oshawa Transit was operated under The City of Oshawa Act, R.S.O.
1960 c. 160 by the Public Utilities Commission. Although situated in an
area of regional government, it did not serve the region.
3. London 270,383
The London Transit Commission was operated under the City of
London Act, S.0. 1951 c. 107. In 1978, the transit system was exceeding
the target revenue/cost ratio for a city its size.
4. Mississauga 250,017
In 1978, Mississauga Transit was operating under an authority. It
had received special consideration from the provincial government re-
garding its revenue/cost ratio since it had been experiencing very rapid
growth prior to 1978.
5. Ottawa 304,462
0C Transpo was established under the Regional Municipality of Ot-
tawa-Carleton Act, S.0. 1972 c. 126. It served the region, and also served
part of Hull, its sister city in Quebec. Under the Act, the system had to
serve a designated "Urban Transit Area," and could serve areas outside
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this area if the Commission agreed. Any deficit incurred by the system
was borne by the communities served on a levy basis.
6. Hamilton 529,371
The Hamilton Street Railway Company was owned and operated by
the regional government under the Regional Municipality of Hamilton-
Wentworth Act, S.O. 1976 c. 84. Its scheme for regional service was much
like that of the Ottawa system.
7. Toronto 2,803,101
As of 1978, the Toronto Transit Commission was operated under the
Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act, R.S.O. 170, c. 295, and under
the Act could agree to give service within twenty-five miles of Toronto.
The T.T.C. had a large in-house staff, a high per capita ridership level
and more political influence than any other system. In 1978, it had suc-
ceeded in having its target revenue/cost ratio reduced from 72 percent to
seventy percent.
III. SYSTEMS STUDIED IN QUEBEC
In 1978, the province of Quebec provided a minimum subsidy of
forty-five percent of the deficit of any system. This could increase to a
maximum of fifty-five percent if ridership increased, and a one percent
rise leading to a forty-six percent subsidy, and so on. Aside from the
ridership incentive, the province had no formal policies in effect.
Hull 60,691
The Outaouais Transit Commission, a regional system, was estab-
lished under the Communaut Regionale de l'Outaouais Act, Statutes of
Quebec 1969, c. 85. This Act and the Act for the Montreal system are
almost identical. Both establish a voting system for the communities
served by the transit system, with voting power tied partially to the ex-
tent of the deficit attributed to that community.
Montreal 2,802,485
The Montreal transit system operated under the Communautg Ur-
bane de Montreal Act, Statutes of Quebec, 1969, c. 84. The Montreal sys-
tem allowed management the greatest amount of freedom to make rout-
ing and volume of transit decisions without interference of any system
studied.
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IV. SYSTEMS STUDIED IN NOVA SCOTIA
Halifax 271,200
The Halifax Transit Corporation, the only system studied in Nova
Scotia, received no provincial funding 1978. Provincial funding was condi-
tional on the municipal governments' involved accepting regional govern-
ment. The city funded the entire operating deficit and capital costs of the
system.
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